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Foreword 
 
The digitalisation of an ever-increasing number of goods and services is causing an 
unprecedented and radical shift in consumer lifestyles and habits: The distinction between 
suppliers and demanders is becoming blurred, and consumers are more and more frequently 
taking on the role of supplier of those goods or services. Regulatory tasks which were 
previously the prerogative of the State can now be found as the default settings in algorithms 
applied by private-sector companies. 
 
The Advisory Council for Consumer Affairs (Sachverständigenrat für Verbraucherfragen, 
SVRV) has set itself the task of investigating whether consumer law as it currently stands is 
able to meet the requirements of a digital world. For the Advisory Council, “consumer law 
2.0” means that it is no longer possible to carry on with business as usual and that consumer 
law urgently needs an update.  
 
This report builds upon external studies which the Advisory Council commissioned in 2016 
and upon papers published in its Working Paper Series. It continues a series of reports which 
the Advisory Council has published on digitalisation in trade, finance, health and 
crowdfunding, and it prepares the ground for forthcoming reports on digital sovereignty and 
consumer scoring. 
 
The Advisory Council would like to express its particular thanks to Prof Dr Hans-W. Micklitz, 
who had overall responsibility for this report, to Prof Gesche Joost and Ms Helga Zander-
Hayat for their outstanding support, to Ass-Prof Dr Kai Purnhagen, Prof Dr Peter Rott, Prof 
Dr Gerald Spindler, Ass-Prof Dr Stefan Wahlen and Prof Dr Christiane Wendehorst, who 
made their expertise available in the context of the external studies, and to the Advisory 
Council Office, especially Dr Irina Domurath, for providing contextual and administrative 
assistance in the writing of the report. 
 
 
Berlin, December 2016 
 
Advisory Council for Consumer Affairs 
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Executive Summary 
I. Potential solutions as regards the law of digital services 
1. Re information provided before establishing a legal relationship 
The Advisory Council for Consumer Affairs recommends: (1) Before a contract is concluded 
the entrepreneur must inform consumers on one page in each case (500 words) about the 
relevant data protection requirements and about the terms and conditions. This obligation 
also applies when changes are made during the contract term. The entrepreneur must use 
typographic means to clearly highlight any subsequent changes on the one-page information 
document. The one-page information document and any updates are to be transmitted to 
consumers on a durable medium within the meaning of section 126b of the German Civil 
Code. (2) Each change entitles the consumer to withdraw from the contract, to which 
reference must be made. (3) Sanctions must be imposed against breaches of the duty to 
include such a reference. 
2. Re package offers (including services) when concluding a contract 
The Advisory Council recommends introducing the following information requirements: (1) 
When consumers purchase an electronic device with pre-installed software, they must be 
(separately) informed about the price of the device and of the software. The case-law of the 
European Court of Justice, which requires the opposite, must be adjusted by way of an 
amendment to the EU Directive. (2) Where third parties are financing digital services this 
must be disclosed to consumers. 
3. Re the scope and legal effects of consent  
The Advisory Council recommends: Data protection requirements and requirements as 
regards terms and conditions for consent are to be put on an equal footing. The principle of 
separation and transparency under Article 7(2) of the General Data Protection Regulation is 
to be transferred to the inclusion of terms and conditions. Only those rights and obligations 
which have been set out in a one-page document (see Recommendation no. 1) are binding.  
4. Re determining the contracting partner 
The Advisory Council recommends: (1) In accordance with the proposal put forward by 
France, the platform operator must provide precise information about the service’s function 
and the nature of the legal relationships; if the platform requires consumers to open a user 
account, this information is to be provided before the account is created. (2) In line with its 
actual function, the platform operator must take on a monitoring and control function; in the 
event of violating these obligations it will be liable vis-à-vis the consumer. (3) A rule should 
be introduced in the sharing economy based on which anyone providing chargeable services 
via a platform is to be treated like an entrepreneur within the meaning of section 14 of the 
German Civil Code until the opposite is proven. 
5. Re the subject of the legal relationship 
The Advisory Council recommends making it clear that “as is” digital services constitute a 
legal relationship which is linked to rights and obligations. 
The Advisory Council recommends extending the rule on information documents which must 
be transmitted before a legal relationship is established to include “as is” services. 
The Advisory Council recommends adding those clauses which are typically found in digital 
contexts and, in particular, in end-user agreements to the black and grey list of prohibited 
clauses. 
5 
 
The Advisory Council recommends stepping up research into the possible use of blockchain 
technology and the possible legal consequences of smart contracts.  
The Advisory Council recommends systematically analysing the interplay between data 
protection law, copyright law and private/consumer law, because only a holistic perspective 
opens up the possibility of finding generalised rules which could provide insights and indicate 
the way forward for the digital world. From the consumer perspective, what is of the greatest 
importance in the short term is how the monitoring of terms and conditions can be brought 
into line with data protection and copyright law. 
The Advisory Council recommends making it clear that privacy by design and privacy by 
default as well as basic IT security measures are part of the definition of the “use intended 
under the contract” within the meaning of section 434 (1) no. 1 of the German Civil Code. 
6. Re the rights resulting from the legal relationship 
The Advisory Council recommends making it clear that the right of data portability is also to 
be understood as a right of termination by means of which consumers can demand that their 
data be returned free of charge and deleted on a standard, machine-readable and 
interoperable medium.  
The Advisory Council recommends, to counteract the discrepancy between the purchase 
contract and digital content provided by third parties, that product warranty liability be 
introduced against the producer or against the importer into the EU who is also liable against 
the consumer as regards third-party digital services. 
7. Re improving individual redress 
The Advisory Council suggests that business and consumer associations should be involved 
in drafting model contracts for digital services which not only safeguard key elements of the 
content of such contracts but also link in to arbitration mechanisms.  
The Advisory Board suggests closely monitoring the effects of private, commercial 
mechanisms on redress backed by associations. 
8. Re improving collective redress  
The Advisory Council agrees with the thrust of this year’s Consumer Law Conference at 
which calls were made to add governmental monitoring (digital agency) to legal redress 
through associations. Based on the example set by the UK, an additional “super complaint” 
would be a conceivable option, a procedure in which associations could force the authorities 
to act by calling on a court if need be. 
9. Re the suitable means for implementing the proposals 
The Advisory Council advocates implementing the proposals in a manner which maintains 
the cohesion between the proposed rules. In view of the political sensitivities which go along 
with any interference with the German Civil Code, amendments to the German Civil Code 
should be limited to what is absolutely essential. More specifically, a presumption rule for 
commercial activities would have to be incorporated into sections 13 and 14 of the German 
Civil Code and consent under data protection law brought into line with consent under the 
law of general terms and conditions. 
10. Re the need for an evidence-based consumer policy 
The Advisory Council recommends taking the necessary precautions in order to be able to 
shape an evidence-based consumer law policy.  
11. Re the problem of competence 
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The Advisory Council is convinced that Germany is free to take the political lead and, 
possibly together with other Member States, to call on the European Commission to act. 
II. Potential solutions as regards regulating algorithms 
1. Requirements under the Federal Data Protection Act 
The Advisory Council notes that the existing rule in section 28b of the Federal Data 
Protection Act represents a useful starting point when it comes to regulating self-learning 
algorithms. 
2. Requirements under the General Data Protection Regulation 
The Advisory Council notes that the rudimentary approaches to regulating algorithms set out 
in the General Data Protection Regulation are insufficient and fall below even the standard 
applied in section 28b of the Federal Data Protection Act. 
3. Re the three possible options for a regulatory approach 
The Advisory Council notes that there are theoretically three possible options for regulating 
this matter: 
• proactive (legality by design): the legislature could oblige enterprises to incorporate 
binding legal requirements into algorithm development;  
• reactive: the legislature could restrict itself to obliging enterprises to comply with the 
law when developing algorithms (which actually goes without saying) and then focus 
on ex-post monitoring; 
• the happy medium: the legislature could set a regulatory framework which combines 
binding governmental requirements with self-regulation.  
4. Re lack of transferability of technical regulation 
The Advisory Council notes that it will not be possible to regulate algorithms using the means 
and technologies available for regulating industrial products. 
1. Re the deficits and consequences of a reactive approach 
The Advisory Council is convinced that sticking to “business as usual” is, politically speaking, 
not a serious option. The political realm is called to drop the option of ex-post controls, the de 
facto approach, and to look for a regulation which does justice to the specific features of 
algorithms. 
2. Re the limited possibilities of co-regulation 
The Advisory Council notes that the widely touted co-regulation in the form of government 
procedural framework-setting to regulate algorithms needs to be modified. 
7. Re the need for an Algorithm Act 
The Advisory Council recommends  
(1) putting in place the legal requirements to ensure that algorithms take account of the 
requirements of consumer law, data protection law, anti-discrimination law and digital 
security. In the case of algorithms which enter into direct contact with consumers, the 
underlying parameters need to be made transparent. Legal responsibility also needs 
to be assignable in the case of self-learning algorithms and applicable consumer 
protection regulations need to be complied with; 
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(2) ensuring that, based on standardised disclosure requirements, algorithms are 
disclosed to a circle of experts in the digital agency who carry out spot checks to see 
whether they are legally sound. Standardised software engineering procedures need 
to be developed to that end; 
(3) that enterprises should also be called on to draw up a code of conduct on the use of 
personal data, artificial intelligence systems and big data analysis. 
8. Re the problem of competence 
Subject to more in-depth investigation, the Advisory Council believes that competence for 
drawing up an Algorithm Act has remained with the Member States, despite the objective of 
full harmonisation set out in the General Data Protection Regulation.  
III. Potential solutions as regards the need for a digital agency 
1.  Re the need for immediate political action 
The Advisory Council recommends establishing a digital agency in which previous 
competencies linked to digital services are pooled and expanded. 
2. Re institutional embedding of the digital agency 
The Advisory Council is in favour of assigning the Federal Cartel Office those tasks which 
are being considered as part of the digital agency’s remit. This will ensure that those legal 
issues which the digital economy raises and which go together are not pulled apart on 
extraneous grounds.  
3. Re the tasks and competencies of the digital agency 
The Advisory Council recommends assigning all the necessary tasks to the digital agency 
and guaranteeing it the necessary resources so that it is in a position to proactively 
investigate technical and legal issues raised in the digital economy, to draw up proposals, 
discuss these in the public domain, develop codes of conduct with business and consumers, 
and to develop recommendations and proposal for the legislature. 
4. Re the problem of competence 
The Advisory Council recommends commissioning a legal expert opinion which addresses 
the question of the merging of German authorities to the extent that these are also required 
to implement tasks for which EU law sets legally binding institutional and procedural 
requirements.  
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Part I Purpose, structure and thread of the report 
I. Three objectives 
This report has three objectives: 
First, to trace and evaluate the debate around the need to regulate digital consumer 
services. The Advisory Council takes up the discussion on the role and function of digital 
platforms launched in December 2015/January 2016 and broadens it to address questions 
around the sharing economy and the Internet of Things: Of what value are the diverse 
regulations proposed by the Association of German Jurists (DJT), the European Commission 
and academics1 participating in the debate? Can they achieve the worthy aim of 
safeguarding the autonomy of consumers in the digital age?  
More specifically: Taking a holistic perspective, what action is urgently necessary to adapt 
applicable rules to the challenges the digital world poses – from when a legal relationship is 
entered into until it is terminated? 
Second, to give an outlook on those pressing issues and emerging problems which go along 
with ongoing developments in the field of digital technologies, for instance software agent 
systems, regulation by algorithm and the possibilities inherent to big data. Given its remit, the 
Advisory Council believes that its task is to point out the kinds of questions which are raised 
and to come up with possible solutions so as to initiate a debate about political solutions. 
This on no account means that it is siding with what are known as exceptionalists,2 but is 
based on the realisation that it is necessary to consider the possibility that social, economic 
and political disruption is occurring.  
More specifically: Would statutory regulation of big data in the shape of a law of algorithms 
be a conceivable way of getting a grip on the risks to the autonomy and sovereignty of 
consumer citizens?  
Third, to develop concrete proposals for improving the enforcement of rights in a digital 
society. More than ever before, any future regulation must never lose sight of the matter of 
feasibility. It is hard for consumers to recognise when they are being sent personalised 
advertising, and yet they are supposed to enforce their own rights. How is that possible? 
Collective redress is getting structurally more and more difficult. The focus here is on a 
proposal put forward jointly by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy and the 
Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection3 regarding a digital agency which 
would, firstly, have to make expertise available and, secondly, improve the means of 
enforcing rights. 
More specifically: What should a digital agency look like, what competencies should it have 
and what tasks should it take on in order to safeguard consumer rights? 
II. Background and scope of the report 
When it comes to consumer policy, Germany more or less acts in response to impetus 
coming from the EU. The Federal Government’s Consumer Policy Report discusses new 
business models and potential risks in regard to digital consumer policy and throws up basic 
                                                      
1
 The plural form is used throughout the report to refer to all genders. [Translator’s note: This is only of 
relevance in the German version of the report.] 
2
 The term “exceptionalist” is used in the legal debate to refer to those who affirm that disruption is a 
reality, see Part II, III. 2. below. 
3
 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi)/Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer 
Affairs (BMJV), Programme of Measures for More Security, Sovereignty and Self-determination in the 
Digital Economy < 
https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Artikel/Ma%C3%9Fnahmenprogramm_B
MJV_BMWi.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2) 
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questions, yet does not go into them in any great detail. The joint initiative of the Federal 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection 
may serve as evidence of that,4 given that it says nothing about software agents, regulation 
by code or big data although these three areas specifically raise questions which urgently 
need answering. 
In 2015 the Advisory Council undertook basic work in regard to the digital world and trade, 
the digital world and finance, and the digital world and health; the legal issues these raise 
were left aside, though.5 This explains the focus of this 2016 Report. The Advisory Council 
will be continuing its work in 2017 and will, among other things, deliver an opinion on the 
controversial debate on the worth of data and the right to one’s own data. 
The Advisory Council commissioned five external studies in 2016 in preparation for this 
report:6 
1. M. Schmidt-Kessel, M. Larch, K. Erler, B. Heid, A. Grimm, University of Bayreuth: 
Exploratory study on available and missing data in consumer protection law; 
2. K. Purnhagen/St. Wahlen, University of Wageningen, the Netherlands: The term 
“consumer” in the 21st century, “consumer citizen” and “consumer producer”; 
3. Ch. Wendehorst, University of Vienna: Problems regarding ownership and property in 
regard to the Internet of Things which are directly relevant to consumers, plus a 
market study compiled by the Institute for Innovation and Technology (iit) in Berlin;  
4. G. Spindler, University of Göttingen: Regulation by technology; 
5. P. Rott, University of Kassel: Report on opening up and evaluating open questions 
raised and challenges faced by German consumer law policy in the 21st century. 
 
Reference should also be made to preparatory work done by the Advisory Council in the 
form of the following four working papers which were drawn up in 2016 and incorporated into 
this report: 
1. I. Domurath/L. Kosyra, Consumer Data Protection in the Internet of Things, SVRV 
Working Paper No. 3; 
2. Ph. Schmechel, Consumer Data Protection in the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation, SVRV Working Paper No. 4; 
3. I. Domurath, Consumers and Warranties for Material Defects in the Platform 
Economy, SVRV Working Paper No. 5; 
4. L. Adam/H.-W. Micklitz, Information, Advice and Intermediation in the Digital World, 
Legal Issues as Regards Finance, Health and Trade, SVRV Working Paper Nr. 6. 
 
III. Structure and thread of the report 
Part II of this report deals with the digital world and its consumer law policy relevance. Part III 
addresses digital services as reflected in contract law. Part IV looks into the future-related 
issues of algorithms and big data. Part V delves into new forms of institutional embedding. 
Parts III to V apply a standard analysis matrix: (1) identifying the problems, (2), illustrating the 
legal status quo influenced by reform proposals being discussed in the political and 
academic arena, (3) treating and discussing possible solutions.  
                                                      
4
 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy/Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer 
Protection (op. cit., fn. 3). 
5
 See the 2015 Reports: http://www.svr-verbraucherfragen.de/veroeffentlichungen/ (German only). 
6
 The reports and working papers are available (in German only) on the Advisory Council’s 
website:http://www.svr-verbraucherfragen.de/veroeffentlichungen/. 
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Part II  The digital world and its consumer law policy relevance 
I. Legal policy context 
The authoritative set of rules when it comes to private transactions between consumers and 
enterprises are to be found in the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB); 
consumer contract law was incorporated into that Code in 2002. Legal policy proposals 
aimed at radically revising the German Civil Code are a delicate matter, given that they 
would shake the very foundations of a society which is based on private law. In 2016 the 
Association of German Jurists tackled the question of whether the German Civil Code needs 
updating in the age of digitalisation. The expert F. Faust7 proposed making minor corrections 
to the German Civil Code although he believes it is in principle possible to tackle the legal 
issues which digitalisation raises8 using the range of tried and tested tools available in the 
Code. That is not to say, though, that there are no critics of such an approach. The 
overwhelming majority of jurists wants to leave the interplay between private actions and 
judicial scrutiny well alone.9  
The one-sided focus on consumer protection legislation being subject to judicial scrutiny, as 
is currently the case, is problematical. The 2016 Consumer Law Conference addressed the 
need for and feasibility of administrative scrutiny of consumer protection legislation.10 The 
majority of speakers at the conference came out in favour of expanding administrative 
enforcement of rights in regard to economic consumer protection, regardless of the 
challenges which digitalisation poses. They believe that official redress should not replace 
the current model in which control is in the hands of consumer and business associations 
(referred to in German as the “Verbandsmodell”), but that it should supplement it. The notion 
of official monitoring of terms and conditions, of unfair advertising and, further, of consumer 
legislation in regulated markets is highly problematical in the context of German law, civil law 
and German civil-law political theory because it shakes the very foundations of a private-law 
system in which the enforcement of rights is equal to the enforcement of individual rights 
before a court. As far as collective redress by way of a cease-and-desist order against terms 
and condition and unfair advertising is concerned, the general thinking is that the established 
model of legal redress before the courts should remain.  
Of course the balance has shifted in recent years – when it comes to individual redress 
towards alternative dispute resolution methods (on the instigation of the EU) and when it 
comes to collective redress towards greater emphasis on collective means of redress over 
and above cease-and-desist orders, from the importance of a cease-and-desist declaration 
upstream of a cease-and-desist order towards the controversially discussed introduction of a 
general collective right to compensation. A proposal may well be put forward in the course of 
the current legislative term which, in the Federal Ministry of Justice’s view, will end up 
extending associations’ right of legal standing.11 In addition to cease-and-desist orders 
                                                      
7
 Faust, Digitale Wirtschaft – Analoges Recht – Braucht das BGB ein Update? (report presented at the 
71st Conference of the Association of German Jurists in 2016). 
8
 In the same vein as Balkin, “The Path of Robotics Law”, California Law Review Circuit, Vol. 6, June 
2015, p. 45: “We should try not to think about characteristics of technology as if these features were 
independent of how people use technology in their lives and in their social relations with others. 
Because the use of technology in social life evolves, and because people continually find new ways to 
employ technology for good or for ill, it may be unhelpful to freeze certain features of use at a 
particular moment and label them ‛essential’.” 
9
 For a plea for continuity see Dechamps, “Digitale Wirtschaft – das Instrumentarium des BGB 
genügt”, (2016), Anwaltsblatt, p. 632; Graf von Westphalen is critical of continuing on the same path, 
see Graf von Westphalen, “Digitale Revolution – und das Recht bleibt wie es ist?”, (2016), 
Anwaltsblatt, p. 619; Blocher, “The next big thing – Blockchain – Bitcoin – Smart Contracts”, (2016), 
Anwaltsblatt, p. 612. 
10
 Among others, Brönneke/Micklitz/Rott. A publication including the talks edited by H. Schulte-Nölke is 
in preparation. 
11
 Gesell/Meller-Hannich/Stadler, “Musterfeststellungsklage in Verbrauchersachen”, NJW-Aktuell, 
Standpunkt, Vol. 5/2016, p. 14–15. 
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associations are also to be given the option of filing collective claims for damages. The 
proposal does not break the mould of the Verbandsmodell which is currently dominant in 
Germany.12  
Collective redress by a consumer authority – as a complement to the Verbandsmodell – 
would lead to a key shift in terms of scrutiny. This would only make sense if it were possible 
to team up the existing, tried and tested means of enforcement before the courts with the 
proposed official monitoring. Even though administrative decisions can and must be 
reviewed by a court, a glance at those EU Member States which have already established a 
consumer protection authority with the right of legal standing shows that governmental 
monitoring goes along with a certain amount of de-judicalisation, that is less judicial 
scrutiny.13 The current Grand Coalition Government in Germany is more inclined to entrust 
the task of monitoring terms and conditions and unfair competition to the Federal Cartel 
Office.  
In the course of implementing the EU’s Distance Selling Directive, the German legislature 
introduced the term “consumer” into the German Civil Code in 2000. Key rules of substantive 
consumer law were then also incorporated in 2002, namely the law of general terms and 
conditions, regulations on the modalities of contract conclusion (in the case of direct sales 
and distance selling) as well as rules on specific types of contract (purchase law, time-
sharing and consumer credit). Since then these parts of the German Civil Code have been a 
source of constant legislative disquiet on account of the activities of the EU. Backed by the 
political majority of the Member States, the EU has become the driving force when it comes 
to consumer law developments since the 1990s. At the 2012 Conference of the Association 
of German Jurists one expert14 proposed taking consumer law out of the German Civil Code 
altogether and drawing up a separate code. More and more people, reputable German legal 
scholars, are beginning to agree with him.15 It is true that since 2002 the German Civil Code 
appears to be constantly under construction because EU requirements on doorstop selling, 
distance selling, consumer credit, time-sharing and now travel law have been fundamentally 
revised since the turn of the millennium.  
This trend appears to be repeating itself when one considers the rising debate on digitalising 
the German Civil Code. All the proposals – in so far as they in fact voice the need for 
regulation – aim to amend the relevant rules in the German Civil Code, for example the term 
“consumer”, the term “ownership”, the law of general terms and conditions, or the term “tort”. 
Following structural logic, this means that the law of digital services would have to be split 
up. What in fact belongs together would have to be pulled apart and incorporated into the 
various categories applied in the German Civil Code. The system of classification applied in 
the German Civil Code takes precedence over the rational logic of the subject matter. This 
line of thinking necessarily leads to a shortening of perspective, since the German Civil Code 
and its catalogue of rules determines the possibilities for dealing with legal problems.  
What is being overlooked here is the fact that the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
and the emerging implementation act overlap with the law of general terms and conditions 
                                                      
12
 “Verbandsmodell” refers to the fact that the monitoring of terms and conditions and of advertising is 
the responsibility of consumer and business associations. 
13
 Rott, Rechtsvergleichende Aspekte der behördlichen Durchsetzung von Verbraucherschutz, Report 
submitted to the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, file no. V B1-7008-3-3-52 
24/2016. A legal comparison as regards the monitoring of terms and conditions and of fair trading 
shows that Germany is the exception. No other country has so many different types of court 
procedures and judicial decisions. Whether more court proceedings equals more consumer protection 
is another matter entirely, though. 
14
 Micklitz, Brauchen Konsumenten und Unternehmen eine neue Architektur des Verbraucherrechts?, 
(report submitted to the 69th Conference of the Association of German Jurists in 2012) p. 129. 
15
 Wagner, “Der Verbrauchsgüterkauf in den Händen des EuGH: Überzogener Verbraucherschutz 
oder ökonomische Realität”, (2016), Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht, Vol. 1, p. 87–120, p. 119. 
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and with fair trading law.16 One could even hypothesise that the General Data Protection 
Regulation has been superimposed on the German Civil Code and that it provides the 
framework not only for data protection but also for the trade in data. A possible medium-term 
alternative would be a self-contained regulation on digital services as a whole, with all the 
associated questions and problems as regards contract and tort law in legislation 
complementary to the General Data Protection Regulation. However, this report, which takes 
a holistic perspective, first and foremost aims to investigate in what areas action urgently 
needs to be taken in terms of adapting applicable rules to the challenges posed by the digital 
world. The entire process will be considered, from when consumers enter into a legal 
relationship until they terminate that legal relationship. 
II. Fundamental decision as regards the scope of digitalisation 
Reducing the challenges which digital society faces to the question of whether the German 
Civil Code or other legislation needs reforming falls short. In fact, it is necessary to look 
beyond the German Civil Code and legal relationships, to shift from a micro to a macro 
perspective, to the question of whether our digital society needs another legal framework, 
one which can meet the challenges before the possible problems begin to take on more 
concrete shape in contractual or quasi-contractual questions. It is necessary to look beyond 
the law to fundamental questions concerning the state, business and society in the age of 
digitalisation. The scientific debate across all those disciplines which are linked to the issue 
of digitalisation is divided into two camps: On the one hand there are those who do not 
regard digitalisation phenomena as bringing about radical social, economic, political and 
philosophical changes; on the other hand there are those who believe that disruption is 
occurring in the development of western industrial and service economies.17 
1. Continuity 
The “business as usual” approach can be found in legal opinions which largely dismiss the 
changing social environment and define the term “digital content” in line with traditional 
conceptual jurisprudence and then break it down into the relevant legal questions, namely 
those regarding media neutrality, data as payment, the content of obligations, the law of 
general terms and conditions, consumer contracts and special obligations, fulfilment of a 
contract on digital content, purchase and works contracts, rental agreements and contracts 
on the drawing up of digital content. Other topics include liability in the context of free 
services and the protection of data. There is a profusion of literature, which is constantly 
growing, on each complex of issues which exhausts itself in debating the pros and cons of 
the need for regulation. The 2016 Conference of the Association of German Jurists set out to 
address one big issue, the question of the century as it were (unless, given that this is the 
21st century and given the scope of digitalisation, it could even be called the question of the 
millennium): Are the legal rules on business transactions dating back to the 19th century – 
following the industrial revolution in the second half of the 19th century and the 20th century 
shift from a manufacturing to a consumption- and service-oriented society – in principle 
suited to overcoming the challenges posed by 21st century digital society?  
The Association of German Jurists sees itself as the mouthpiece of all German – perhaps 
even of all German-speaking – jurists, practitioners, lawyers, judges and scholars. However, 
the number of participants attending the civil-law section of the 2016 Conference of the 
Association of German Jurists fell shockingly below its high demands in terms of content. 
Depending on one’s point of view, one could either play down the relevance of the 
Association of German Jurists or investigate the reasons for the low attendance figures. The 
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fact remains that the Association of German Jurists has over the many years since it was 
established very successfully captured the basic attitude of, perhaps even the basic mood 
among, jurists, at any rate the “prevailing” mood. That is why it is worth emphasising the 
conclusion F. Faust drew in a report submitted to the 2016 Conference, especially since the 
majority of those attending endorsed it: 
Hypothesis no. 13: No new types of contract should be created for contracts 
relating to digital content. 
Hypothesis no. 17: It would not be possible to incorporate a “right to one’s own 
data” into section 823 (1) of the German Civil Code. (Instead a new rule should 
be included in section 303a of the Criminal Code [Strafgesetzbuch, StGB] as 
protective legislation within the meaning of section 823 (2) of the German Civil 
Code.)18  
The debate is by no means over. In 2017 scholars and teachers of civil law will be looking at 
the exact same issue. It will be interesting to see what side of the debate the talks and 
discussions will come down on.19 At this point, however, and in the context of taking our 
“fundamental decision”, the details of any proposals worth considering are not (yet) the issue. 
Rather, the question is whether the social, economic and technological circumstances have 
changed or will change to such an extent that political action beyond making mere marginal 
corrections is what is needed. Restraint similar to that expressed by F. Faust can be found in 
the reports commissioned by the Advisory Council and rendered by K. Purnhagen/St. 
Wahlen,20 Ch. Wendehorst21 and G. Spindler.22 In so far as they actually make any, their 
proposals are limited to possibly supplementing the relevant passages in the German Civil 
Code, to the term “consumer”, the law of general terms and conditions, and the definition of 
“ownership”. That even applies where the analysis leads one to expect something completely 
different. Ch. Wendehorst, for example, feels that  
“The Internet of Things will doubtless lead to a structural erosion of ownership 
and property.”  
A little further on, on the same page she writes:  
“Overall, on account of this development consumers are losing the freedom 
which ownership is supposed to give them and, on account of the price they have 
to pay when purchasing Internet of Things devices, they are becoming even 
more heavily dependent than if they had only rented the product [emphasis 
in original].”23 
D. Post24 described this attitude as “unexceptionalist” and its proponents as 
“unexceptionalists”. Accordingly, online and offline transactions should be treated the same 
as far as possible. Specific rules are not, in principle, required. One need only consider EU 
Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights, in which direct (doorstep) and distance selling are 
approximated as far as possible – and then the difficulties which such approximation brings 
when it comes to dogmatic fine-tuning.  
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The guiding principle of treating online and offline enterprises the same also runs like a red 
thread through the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs’ Green Paper on Digital Platforms.25 
This might be acceptable if there were an easy answer to the following crucial question: Can 
offline and online transactions be treated the same or is there a fundamental difference 
between the two which not only justifies but requires that they be treated differently? All too 
often the need for equal treatment is presupposed, cutting off all further discussion, not least 
because it is borne by the central idea that the law is uniform, that it applies equally to all – a 
maxim adopted by the French Revolution which quite rightly still has a formative influence.  
The unexceptionalists are also referred to as “contractualists”. They seek to overcome the 
challenges which technology poses by defining a contract as something which is concluded 
consensually and autonomously between two people. The crucial maxims here are self-
responsibility and the freedom to contract, i.e. self-regulation rather than state regulation. 
What applies to contract law in principle also ought to apply to all other relevant legal fields. 
As a result, the focus is put on introducing sectoral rules for the Internet, telecommunications 
and energy, an approach which the EU has been forcefully promoting for the last 30 years. In 
the same way as the basic rules of contract law cannot be understood until rules applicable 
to consumer goods purchases have been incorporated, focusing on the horizontal relevance 
of anti-trust law or fair trading law obscures a multitude of special rules which are applicable 
to regulated markets and/or consumers. After all, the power of the claim to general 
application is specifically its rationality. Any deviation needs to be justified. It is 
telecommunications law in particular which causes upheavals in the course of digitalisation, 
because key digital services are excluded from the specific sectoral rules.26 The all-important 
question is whether digitalisation means we need to adopt a new perspective which is 
entirely oriented to the specifics of the digital world and which places the focus on the 
changes made compared to the old world and old law. Put another way: What if what is 
“special” becomes the “new normal” or if this special law continues expanding and leads to a 
fragmentation of the law, which only leaves the new normal with having a catch-all 
function?27 
2. Disruption  
Is disruption happening? Will it happen? How will it manifest itself – as evolution or 
revolution? Those who proclaim that a rupture with the past is occurring argue that the 
phenomenon of digitalisation can best be captured by means of the formula “from atoms to 
bits”.28 Prior to digitalisation, the universe comprised only two levels or layers: a physical and 
a social. The physical layer comprises atoms and all material things, houses, automobiles, 
people and animals. The social layer comprises all those phenomena which the law 
describes as immaterial, that is rights, enterprises and status-related rules. Digitalisation 
adds a third layer. In the words of A. Murray: “Much as atoms can be used in the physical 
world to construct everything from the human liver to an Airbus 380, bits are the basic 
building blocks of the information society.”29  
M. Hildebrandt speaks of a “new animism”30 which characterises the “onlife” world:31 
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“… our life world is increasingly populated with things that are trained to foresee 
our behaviours and pre-empt our intent. These things are no longer stand-alone 
devices; they are progressively becoming interconnected via the cloud, which 
enables them to share their ‘experience’ of us to improve their functionality. We 
are in fact surrounded by adaptive systems that display a new kind of mindless 
agency. (...) The environment is thus becoming ever more animated. At the same 
time we are learning slowly but steadily to foresee that we are being foreseen, 
accepting that things know our moods, our purchasing habits, our mobility 
patterns, our political and sexual preferences and our sweet spots. We are on the 
verge of shifting from using technologies to interacting with them, negotiating 
their defaults, pre-empting their intent while they do the same to us.”32 
In this onlife (not online) world, the consumption of products is personalised, anticipatory and 
automated. Of course, this new world of consumption will always need a contract or at least 
a legal relationship which humans conclude/enter into via a service. From the moment a 
human enters the digital world, though, smart technology takes over. In the onlife world the 
boundaries between the offline and online worlds become blurred, the distinction between 
consumer transactions which are negotiated by humans and those which are managed and 
implemented by software agents even more so.  
One can and must go very much further and ask whether, in the onlife world, consumer 
protection regulations will be replaced by smart technologies. Instead of consumer protection 
by law and legislation we will have consumer protection by technology and self-regulation or, 
to put it more succinctly: regulation by technology. The perspective shifts again. The focus is 
on technologies such as blockchain, Bitcoin and smart contracts, which have not yet become 
established beyond the fringes of the business world (speed trading) and in particular have 
not yet entered consumer law. Estimates as to what chances legislation has of being 
replaced by technology vary greatly. G. Spindler’s assessment is cautiously sceptical, 
because the law cannot be translated into the black and white logic on which software is 
based.33 W. Blocher, by contrast, is quite euphoric when it comes to the prospects of 
regulation by technology, not least in the sense of its inherent possibilities for (re)gaining 
autonomy and for reversing legal relationships (from B2C to C2B).34 
Those who get a sense that fundamental technological and social changes are close at hand 
must, logically, be described as exceptionalists. They seek what is “new” and feel that the 
world has changed, that the relationship between humans and technology has been entirely 
redefined. They call for a Digital Code “to safeguard civil liberties in the age of Internet 
capitalism”.35 Cyberbutlers,36 our constant companions who still sounded rather utopian back 
in 2000, have long since become a reality. However, our contracts with service providers 
often have decade-long terms. Our legal system is not set up to cope with these kinds of 
temporal dimensions. You do not have to look to the future to draw this consequence. Most 
of us have been using Google on a daily basis for years, the same goes for Facebook. 
Google and Facebook have collated data about our lives, and these form the basis of their 
business models. Digital services contracts, that is in so far as they are contracts in the 
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sense of a two-sided legal transaction, establish a continuing obligation which stands 
alongside traditional types of contracts such as rental, credit and energy agreements.37 
III. Possible consequences of the debate around continuity v. disruption 
What are the consequences for the legislature of this tension between the old and new, 
between continuity and disruption? Do we need legal regulations for contracts which 
consumers conclude with their cyberbutler? Do we need more and more far-reaching 
interference on the part of the legislature in order to control self-regulation or self-regulation 
which is becoming increasingly independent ex ante? If so, then the advocates prove to be 
regulators: Instead of freedom of contract and self-regulation they want the legislature to be 
responsible for ex-ante scrutiny and supervision, perhaps coupled with the need for 
competent governmental agencies to rectify self-regulation ex post where necessary.  
Where does the European Commission stand on this issue and how far has the German 
legislature got in terms of its planning and deliberations? The European Commission is 
rushing ahead, saying there is a strong need to continue developing contract law. Its 
Communication dated May 2015 is very telling:38  
“Digital contracts for Europe – Unleashing the potential of e-commerce”  
Further on:39  
“4. ACTING BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE 
“We need to act now on the digital dimension... 
“The pace of commercial and technological change due to digitalisation is very 
fast, not only in the EU, but worldwide. The EU needs to act now to ensure that 
business standards and consumer rights will be set according to common EU 
rules respecting a high level of consumer protection and providing for a modern 
business friendly environment. It is of utmost necessity to create the framework 
allowing the benefits of digitalisation to materialise, so that EU businesses can 
become more competitive and consumers can have trust in high-level EU 
consumer protection standards. By acting now, the EU will set the policy trend 
and the standards according to which this important part of digitalisation will 
happen.” 
The Commission has gone further than merely making announcements: In December 2015 it 
put forward two proposals, one on the regulation of digital content and one on online and 
other distance sales of goods.40 Both Proposals aim at full harmonisation, and both are the 
subject of intense legal policy and academic debate.41 That debate revolves around the 
canon of questions which the Association of German Jurists already raised, namely meeting 
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the digital challenges by means of contract law. What is behind this strong rhetoric? Is the 
EU calling for a new legal order?  
R. Brownsword42 looked at both Proposals with a view to the difference between 
unexceptionalists and exceptionalists and came to the conclusion that the European 
Commission has to be classed as an unexceptionlist. What is more relevant from a 
consumer policy perspective is that the Commission is attempting, with the help of these two 
Proposals, to roll back the previously guaranteed level of consumer protection in regard to 
online purchase contracts in favour of trade and commerce. More specifically, there is a 
certain degree of tension between the Consumer Goods Directive 1999/44/EC on the one 
hand and the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU, which regulates direct and distances 
sales, on the other. The two Proposals interleave the two Directives. Yet again, the much-
criticised objective of full harmonisation leads to less protection, this time, though, less 
protection as already guaranteed in EU directives. In other words, online trade serves to 
harmonise consumer law for the online and offline worlds, to the consumer’s detriment. The 
new technology and the proclaimed need to expand online trade serve to legitimise the 
Commission’s approach. 
The Federal Government’s 2016 Consumer Policy Report43 does not address the 
fundamental question, namely regulation of the “onlife” world. However, the report does state 
the following, much in the same vein as the European Commission: 
“Digitalisation doubtless does also have its economic advantages, but it poses 
new challenges when it comes to consumer protection. It is the job of policy-
makers to put in place the regulatory framework for binding and effective 
consumer protection standards in the digital world. Strengthening self-
determination, guaranteeing freedom of choice and transparency, comprehensive 
and comprehensible consumer information, and security in the Internet are 
decisive. That is the key to more consumer confidence, which is necessary if new 
business models and digital innovations are to succeed. Consumer data 
protection is of particular relevance in this regard.” 
The report addresses neither of the two Commission Proposals. The measures announced 
by the Federal Government make no reference whatsoever to the fundamental problem, nor 
to the question of whether digital legal relations require specific rules, to name just this 
example from the context of possible regulatory approaches. The Federal Government 
restricts itself to the correction of details, as do the vast majority of legal scholars. 
The approach adopted by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in its Green 
Paper on Digital Platforms appears to be much more fundamental in its approach, because it 
is more open in the matter itself.44 That may well be down to the nature of a green paper, 
which seeks to ask questions rather than to provide answers. These are expected to be 
delivered in the upcoming White Book in the spring of 2017. We will have to wait and see 
whether they will be exceptionalist or unexceptionalist answers. Questions around the 
Guidelines on Data Sovereignty – Input for the Creation of Private Digital Autonomy and the 
call for a digital agency are particularly relevant from the point of view of consumer 
protection:45 
“A digital agency in the guise of a high-performing and internationally 
interconnected federal-level centre of expertise could have these remits. It could 
support other specialist authorities (such as the Federal Cartel Office and 
                                                      
42
 Brownsword, The E-Commerce Directive, Consumer Transactions, and the Digital Single Market: 
Questions of Regulatory Fitness, Regulatory Disconnection and Rule Redirection, talk given on 18 
June 2016 at the SECOLA Conference in Tartu, Estonia, http://www.secola.org/. 
43
 Bundestag Printed Paper 18/9495, 25 Aug. 2016, p. 10. 
44
 As at May 2016; a white book containing concrete proposals is set to be published in spring 2017,  
p. 64. 
45
 Faust (op. cit., fn. 7) p. 66. 
18 
 
consumer protection offices) in the digitalisation process and also identify and 
eliminate obstacles to implementing policy strategies. Like the Federal 
Environment Office and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, a new 
digital agency can help to meet one of the key social challenges we face.” 
The impetus for the latter came in the autumn of 2015 from the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and Energy/Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection’s 
Programme of Measures for More Security, Sovereignty and Self-determination in the Digital 
Economy – Challenges and Action for Society, Business and Consumers.46 Depending on 
their interpretation and orientation, data sovereignty, digital autonomy and the digital agency 
could become milestones in the development of digital consumer law. 
 
Part III Legal relationships in regard to digital services 
The micro perspective seeks to address the well-known and mounting problems as regards 
consumer law, including consumer data protection law. The focus is increasingly being 
placed on four topics which are oriented to social issues and not to a system of classification 
of whatever shape or form which is predetermined by the legal system. This list of topics is, 
however, not necessarily to be regarded as exhaustive. The Internet of Things is becoming 
the ostensible phenomenon in which consumer law and data protection law are increasingly 
becoming intertwined. “A new dimension has been added to the world of information and 
communication technologies: from anytime, anyplace connectivity for anyone, we will now 
have connectivity for anything.”47 According to a report published by the UK Government,48 
more than 14 billion devices worldwide were already connected to the Internet in 2014.  
This deterritorialised connectivity of things which is also devoid of any temporal context gives 
rise to numerous problems. For example, ethical issues raise the fundamental question of 
how we as humans should act and behave.49 The Internet of Things is of relevance to ethical 
issues on account of the changes made to key terms because of how technology connects 
the world of things with our everyday lives. The fact that things can communicate with each 
other entails a considerable loss of control on the part of humans. This raises questions 
around social justice, trust, the blurring of contexts and the lack of consumers’ and citizens’ 
neutrality and autonomy. 
Part III of this report addresses the legal questions which arise from this deterritorialised 
connectivity. They concern the conclusion of contracts, contracting parties, problems around 
the legal classification of the actions of platforms, liability for defects, IT security, data 
protection and problems regarding the enforcement of rights in deterritorialised contexts. The 
following issues will be discussed against this backdrop: 
• Issues around the conclusion of a contract and liability,  
• The role and function of platforms,  
• Data protection and IT security and  
• The deterritorialisation of consumption. (Consumers often do not know where an 
enterprise is domiciled; if it is domiciled abroad, a complicated set of legal building 
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blocks is available which has a great deal to offer legal scholars but is of very little 
benefit to consumers.) 
Part III concludes with a discussion of viable solutions. So far, enterprises have in practice 
dictated the matter by way of their terms and conditions, advertising and regulation by 
design. The field has now recently also come to the attention of jurists. The result is an 
overwhelming array of suggestions for solving certain legal issues, or not as the case may 
be. Only the EU has so far reacted to this development by making any legislative proposals 
in the form of the General Data Protection Regulation and its 2015 Proposal on digital 
content in consumer contracts. The Association of German Jurists has looked into the 
matter. However, it has not really been in any position to make any suggestions for solving 
what are as yet unanswered questions. 
I. Conclusion of contract 
This section addresses the civil-law problems which arise in connection with Internet of 
Things devices. In particular, they include the packaging of services, the obligations on digital 
service providers offering “as is” services50 regulated by means of terms and conditions, and 
the special problem of the classification, under civil law, of declarations of intent when 
automated systems are used in the Internet of Things. 
1. Information and packaging 
Hardware and software 
Today, when consumers purchase technical devices the software is generally pre-installed. 
The practice of packaging services is not ruled out per se under fair trading law; the incentive 
effect of a good offer is always a desirable consequence of performance-based 
competition.51 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) recently ruled that pre-installed software 
on a computer was not an unfair commercial practice. The case revolved around the 
question of whether the lack of price information regarding individual programs represents a 
misleading commercial practice within the meaning of Article 5(4)(a) and Article 7 of the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC. The ECJ came to the conclusion that the 
mere lack of price information did not result in any misleading of consumers, since the lack of 
information regarding individual programs was neither suited to preventing consumers from 
making an informed transaction decision, nor to causing them to take a transaction decision 
which they would otherwise not have taken. The price of individual programs did not, 
therefore, represent material information within the meaning of Article 7(4) of Directive 
2005/29/EC and the omission of that information was not misleading.52 This interpretation is 
contestable because it misconstrues the role and function of Article 7(4), which not least 
demands transparency ahead of the conclusion of a contract in order to permit competition. 
Accordingly, an informed decision is one which not only serves the consumer but also 
potential competition between the suppliers of the individual price components. 
Services and data 
Another much-debated issue which needs to be addressed in the context of digital services, 
whether they are provided by commodity dealers, app stores or other platforms, is that of 
“data as payment”. This problem is, firstly, discussed in the context of the debate on 
consumer sovereignty and in the debate on data protection v. data sovereignty; secondly, 
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legal problems arise when characterising contracts and their termination. The focus in the 
following will be on consumer law issues.53 
Many contracts for digital services turn out to be “free of charge”, either in the case of the 
purchase of free apps or the free use of platforms. At the same time most business models 
are built around consumer data being used to optimise digital services. This begs the 
question of whether consumers are not in fact “paying” for the use of the app or platform and 
what consequences that has for consumer protection law.  
Section 312 (1) of the German Civil Code provides that sections 312 to 312h of the Code are 
only applicable to non-gratuitous contracts, as a result of which “data as payment” would 
lead to the applicability of a variety of other consumer protection provisions. However, this 
provision is likely not compatible with Community law.54 Non-gratuitousness may also have 
consequences for the liability standard applied (see, e.g., sections 521 and 599 of the 
German Civil Code).55 However, the reductions in liability in the German Civil Code appear 
not to fit, at least not to a contract of use concluded between a platform operator and a 
consumer. A relationship between a supplier and consumer will generally lead to a typical 
“contract under the German Civil Code”. 
2. Information: consent and terms and conditions 
Before concluding a contract consumers are inundated with information. The problems which 
they face in working through and understanding all this information have become a 
commonplace in discussions around information overload.56 
Using terms and conditions serves to standardise and structure information. The aim is to 
make it easier to access the economic system of mass production and mass sales in the 
distance selling system. The monitoring of contract terms is based on the understanding that 
on account of their being structurally unequal consumers have no means of influencing the 
content of those terms.57 Nevertheless, the limits to monitoring terms and conditions when it 
comes to providing effective consumer protection are now well-known. The European 
Commission recently published a study on problems consumers have with terms and 
conditions which confirms that the majority of consumers neither read the terms and 
conditions nor find out about their rights in any other way.58 
3. Information and the subject matter of the legal relationship 
Many digital services are provided in the context of enduring legal relationships. This in 
particular raises the question of whether and to what extent manufacturers are obliged to 
make updates available for the software they produce beyond the end of the contract term, 
and whether and to what extent consumers are obliged to install those updates. The 2016 
Conference of the Association of German Jurists concluded that the manufacturer was to be 
under no obligation to provide updates, because it is to be left to consumers to decide 
whether they actually want the update. 
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However, at least one important exception should be made to this basic principle, and that 
concerns IT security. This is due to the great vulnerability of digital services to hacking and 
malware, above all on account of the low level of security mechanisms which manufacturers 
provide, usually based on a standard set of default passwords. Personalised passwords for 
Internet of Things devices such as refrigerators, washing machines, television sets etc. are 
not yet very widespread or common. The vulnerability of the Internet of Things network as a 
whole was recently made clear during the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack on 21 
October 2016, when home routers and Internet of Things devices were infected with malware 
and websites such as Twitter, PayPal and Airbnb were then taken down by fake traffic. This 
was possible because the malware created a botnet comprising the millions of infected 
computers which were used to launch targeted attacks on one of the main servers used by 
many websites.59 
System and program updates could provide potential protective mechanisms against such 
malware. The option of introducing a manufacturer’s obligation raises the question of 
whether guaranteeing IT security is a “cardinal obligation” under the obligation pursuant to 
section 241 (2) of the German Civil Code. What is clear is that the statutory obligation to 
provide IT security, including software maintenance and upgrades or updates, generally 
represents an obligation to protect pursuant to section 241 of the German Civil Code.60 
Software maintenance comprises all those services which keep the purchased software fully 
functional or restore its functionality.61 
However, the technical changes to which software is subject cannot automatically give rise to 
a permanent maintenance agreement.62 Section 19 of the Act against Restraints of 
Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) at most results in a 
statutory obligation when the software supplier has a dominant position on the market. 
Whether section 242 of the German Civil Code leads to an obligation to provide updates is 
controversial. On the one hand it could result analogously in the obligation to supply spare 
parts for at least five years.63 In that case it is still relevant whether the maintenance services 
are only a subsidiary obligation (only claims for damages) or a separate contractual 
obligation (right of fulfilment).64 According to H.-W. Moritz,65 where software maintenance is a 
free service, it must generally be regarded as merely a subsidiary obligation. However, as 
soon as customers have to pay a fee, it will have to be regarded as a primary obligation. 
Irrespective of the criterion of whether a fee has been paid, it will likely have to be regarded 
as a primary obligation if the maintenance agreement has been explicitly set out in the 
software licence agreement.  
On the other hand, one must ask whether consumers are obliged to protect themselves 
against malware attacks by acquiring and installing important system and program updates. 
Spindler affirms such an obligation at least for automatic or semi-automatic system and 
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program updates which can be installed via an update service embedded in the system, as 
such installation is economically reasonable.66  
The interplay between a manufacturer’s and a consumer’s obligations when it comes to the 
safety of the IT network and the devices which are produced and used complement public-
law regulation in the field of product safety and civil-law product liability. 
4. The special issue of the Internet of Things: use of e-people 
One issue which needs to be clarified when it comes to the conclusion of contracts in the 
Internet of Things is whether the rules set out in the German Civil Code are sufficient to 
cover declarations of intent made by automated or autonomous systems or liability issues in 
the case of defaults and damage. Can a washing machine make a declaration of intent to 
purchase washing detergent by means of an order process which is triggered automatically? 
Can a refrigerator be held liable for automated but incorrect purchases? Can a self-driving 
car be held liable in the case of an accident? 
Conclusion of contract: declarations of intent 
A basic distinction needs to be drawn in the Internet of Things between two different 
systems: automated systems in which users themselves determine the outcome by setting 
parameters and autonomous systems which control the extent of their own behaviour and 
can act without any input from the user.67 Taking the example of an Internet-connected 
washing machine in a smart home that would mean that if the washing machine 
independently orders washing detergent once the fill level drops below a certain point which 
has been predetermined by the user (brand, size of package and online shop), it represents 
an automated system. If the washing machine can order the washing detergent 
independently, then it is acting autonomously.  
The rules in the German Civil Code ought, for the time being, to be sufficient to cover to 
specifics as regards the conclusion of contract. The example of the automated ordering of 
washing detergent “by the washing machine” is, in principle, the converse of a contract 
concluded for vending machines.68 The washing machine’s user makes an anticipated offer 
within the meaning of sections 133 and 157 of the German Civil Code under the condition of 
the proper functioning and availability of the specific washing detergent from the specific 
dealer and, possibly, at a specific price (section 158 (1) of the German Civil Code). The 
online shop then accepts the offer at the latest when it sends the goods to the customer 
(sections 133 and 157 of the German Civil Code). 
Liability for criminal acts 
When it comes to contractual liability, it is the type of underlying contract with the respective 
contracting partner (see below regarding the problem of platforms) which is decisive. When it 
comes to the liability of the producer, it is in particular the rules of section 823 of the German 
Civil Code which are relevant. According to those provisions, the manufacturer must ensure, 
within the bounds of what is technically feasible and economically reasonable, that the 
absolute rights of the users of the product are not violated (on account of the trader creating 
a source of risk by placing a faulty product on the market) or that a third party’s absolute 
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rights are not violated.69 This category includes design fault, manufacturing defects (including 
IT security gaps),70 instruction errors and product monitoring defects.71 
A design fault arises when the technical concept is incorrect, for example the software in a 
smart device is programmed in such a way that it does not prevent the avoidable violation of 
absolute rights.72 Manufacturing defects, including IT security gaps,73 arise through faulty 
manufacturing. In the case of instruction defects the manufacturer is also liable for damage 
which arises on account of the fact that, contrary to its obligation, the manufacturer did not 
draw the user’s attention to the risks which may arise during use despite fault-free 
manufacturing of the product. IT security gaps, too, are design faults. In order to meet the 
product monitoring obligation, a manufacturer must collect all the product-related information 
which reveal a product’s risk features. If this information permits conclusions to be drawn 
regarding the danger inherent in the product, then the manufacturer is also under the active 
obligation to take measures to minimise the risk.74 
The applicability of section 823 et seqq. of the German Civil Code is problematical in regard 
to autonomous systems if the manufacturer is not at fault. Only in the case of lack of due 
diligence would the manufacturer be liable in any way. According to Bräutigam and Klindt, in 
such cases parallels might possibly be drawn to strict liability under section 933 of the 
German Civil Code (animal owner’s liability).75 It is doubtful, though, whether mechanical 
learning leads to comparable unpredictability. The unpredictability of a system’s decisions 
would be the decisive condition for the person who set up the system to be held liable. The 
crucial issue here is to what extent autonomous systems are able to take unpredictable 
decisions based on their underlying algorithms or whether they are always able to choose 
the “best” option from among a number of foreseen scenarios and data sets in the context of 
a new, previously unforeseen scenario. The key thing is how the underlying algorithm is 
constructed. Account must be taken of the fact that the design of a machine-learning system 
is based on generalisation beyond those data sets which have been input into the system; 
that is they build a model out of the sample inputs.76 That means that the legal interpretation 
of “unpredictability” will cause problems, since an algorithm is set up in such a way that it can 
react to unforeseen events, but this response is dependent on the data and “decision-making 
paths” previously input by the programmer. 
II. The role of online platforms 
Legal relationships in the context of the Internet of Things are complex, and not just on 
account of the IT systems which are involved. The various possible constellations of 
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contracting parties raise further legal questions. Since platforms77 can act as intermediaries 
to facilitate the conclusion of a contract between suppliers and demanders and can, in 
certain circumstances, even be actively involved in shaping those contracts, uncertainties are 
beginning to mount regarding who the contracting party is, what type of contract is being 
concluded as well as liability issues. 
1. Vagueness of the terminology applied 
Given their numerous different types of business models, questions arise as to how to 
classify platforms. There is no standardised definition of what a platform is. Various attempts 
have been made, for example based on the consumer’s objective, economic criteria or the 
type of offer. It is difficult to precisely classify platforms on account of their complexity, the 
numerous different business models applied and the resulting consumer protection issues. 
As a lowest common denominator, platforms have been defined as a place where demand 
and supply are brought together and the platform operator exercises a controlling function.78  
This is not to deny the need to categorise platforms. Functional approaches based on the 
materiality of the transaction (goods or services?), the actual transfer of ownership, role 
swapping between supplier and consumer, or the durability of activities undertaken on the 
platform are definitely useful.79 However, were other types of platforms to be included as 
well, the spectrum of functionalities might prove narrow, or too detailed. The traditional binary 
nature of legal provisions (a subject matter can either be subsumed under a provision or not) 
reaches its limits here. Digital platforms operate in an extremely flexible, innovative business 
sector which is undergoing rapid and constant change. As a result the rigid categorisation 
and definition of what platforms are becomes less the issue than accumulating approaches 
which contribute to a legal understanding of them. 
2. Pattern of problems: information, supplier, liability, transparency and 
competition80 
Regardless of the fact that no definition of what platforms are is yet available, what they all 
have in common is a number of recurring problems. Some will at least be covered by existing 
legal provisions, others only with difficulty.81 The problems can be divided into information 
problems (knowing who your contracting partner is) and the complexity of legal relationships, 
contractual obligations, liability issues and problems concerning competition law. 
Information problem: knowing who the supplier is and that supplier’s status 
On account of the nature of websites and contradictory terms and conditions, consumers 
sometimes do not know whether they are concluding a contract with a platform operator or 
supplier; often it is even unclear whether they are actually concluding a contract. Use of an 
Internet platform is as a rule dependent on the platform operator supplying conditions of use. 
The creation of a user account can be classed as the conclusion of a contract of use,82 at 
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least when the consumer has to pay to use the site. Consumers are generally not aware of 
this consequence. 
The lawfulness of such a contract of use can be questioned for various reasons. First of all, 
platform operators can make use of a number of liability exemptions, for example under 
section 10 of the Telemedia Act (Telemediengesetz, TMG) or based on terms and conditions 
with which the operators exclude themselves from the contractual relationship between the 
supplier and consumer. The platform operator generally also exempts himself from the 
obligation to permanently maintain the online structures without making any changes; an 
arbitrary block function to exclude users is not uncommon. Another matter which needs 
discussing is the consumer’s intention to conclude the contract if he has not read the various 
conditions. It may also not be clear whether a supplier has the status of a consumer or that of 
an entrepreneur. This puts the onus not only on the consumer but also on the supplier, since 
the latter must be ready to bear the full thrust of sanctions imposed under consumer 
protection law if the supplier at some point acquires the status of enterprise. 
Liability issues in the triangular relationship between the supplier, platform operator and 
consumer 
Liability issues in the triangular relationship between the supplier, platform operator and 
consumer have also not yet been clarified. Is the platform operator to be co-responsible for 
fulfilling the supplier’s obligations, at least as far as consumer protection obligations are 
concerned? Or is the platform operator even to be liable as a “second contracting party” 
where the consumer cannot hold the supplier liable?83 
Even if one assumes that a contract of use has been concluded, then it is still doubtful 
whether the terms and conditions would stand up to monitoring. Criticism can, first, be raised 
of how the terms and conditions are presented (incorporation): The browse wrap method is 
often used, in which the terms are made available via an additional hypertext link. The web 
wrap method, by contrast, means that users have to find another link or the terms elsewhere 
on the platform’s website. A summary study of British platforms identified the following types 
of liability limitation clauses:84 Contractual liability and liability for criminal acts are frequently 
limited. Clauses which limit liability for computer failures, viruses and other technical 
problems are especially popular. Access clauses which permit platform operators to close 
down the platform at will or to deny consumers access at will are, likewise, not uncommon. 
Sometimes the terms and conditions will permit unilateral price changes. Arbitration clauses 
and exclusive jurisdiction agreements are widespread. In the case of liability these provisions 
will be to the consumer’s detriment, since their effectiveness on many platform sites will be 
cast in doubt. 
Competition: manipulated reviews 
Many platforms use internal systems to rate products, services and the reliability of suppliers 
in order to increase trust in the service they provide. There have been attempts, on the one 
hand, to prevent platforms themselves manipulating these reviews. In 2012 the UK 
Advertising Standards Authority, for example, ruled that it was misleading for TripAdvisor to 
claim in its advertising that its travel reviews are written by “real travellers” although the 
platform operator does not monitor them.85 According to the European Commission, the 
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technique of “dimming” also breaches the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.86 A rating 
system may not paint an excessively positive picture of the supplier.87 
On the other hand, there is now a proper market for manipulated online reviews. In an 
initiative launched in 2013 called Operation Clean Turf, New York Attorney General Eric 
Schneiderman identified a total of 19 enterprises specialising in fake reviews.88 Amazon has 
already sued 1,000 users for posting fake reviews as well as several enterprises whose 
business models are based on fake reviews.89  
One particular problem from the consumer’s perspective is that it is hard to identify 
manipulated reviews. One possible remedy is Cornell University’s Reviewskeptic,90 an 
algorithm which unmasks fake hotel reviews, by its own account with a probability of 90%. 
No 22 of Annex I to the EU Unfair Commercial Practices Directive prohibits “falsely 
representing oneself as a customer” – which could represent the connecting factor for a ban 
on fake reviews.91  
Competition: lack of transparency in search results lists 
The lack of transparency in search results lists is also criticised by many. A search engine 
can act as a passive “conduit” (i.e. which only creates links between Internet users), as an 
“editor” (i.e. which, like a newspaper editor, decides what to show and what not to show) or 
as an “adviser” (i.e. whom users can trust in regard to the suggestions made).92 Search 
engine optimisation exacerbates this problem.93 
The blending of advertising and information and opaque results lists can mislead 
consumers.94 Berlin Regional Court issued a decision much in this vein, ruling that popularity 
rankings on a hotel booking portal influenced by commission payments constitute 
impermissible misleading advertising.95 The same must also apply to search engine results 
provided by other online portals. The blending of advertising and information impairs 
consumers’ judgment. Even if competition law were able to remedy this issue, doubts would 
have to be raised as to how effectively rights can be enforced, since this is left to consumer 
protection agencies and to competitors, who are competent under the Act against Unfair 
Competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, UWG). This may no longer be 
sufficient given the platforms’ increasing market power. 
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3. The example of health apps96 
Like other apps, health apps use a three-pole system of actors in which the app creator, the 
app store and the consumer enter into legal relationships with each other. This creates 
various legal problems, especially as regards the contracting party, the effectiveness of 
terms and conditions, and liability issues. These will be discussed in the following by way of 
example.97 
Uncertainty regarding the contracting party 
What contractual relationships arise between the individual actors following the purchase of a 
health app? Generally speaking, official iOS and Windows app stores only sell apps for their 
own operating systems via their own official sales channels. On account of their market 
power, many suppliers create their apps for iOS and Windows; in consequence they are 
forced to accept the official app stores’ sales terms. The following analysis focuses on the 
Apple App Store. The situation is similarly complex for other sales channels, such as Google 
Play, Microsoft Windows Phone Marketplace, BlackBerry App World and the Amazon App 
Store for Android.98 
The conditions applicable in the relationship between Apple and the supplier of the app are 
set out in detail in the iOS Developer Program License Agreement (“iOS Agreement”). Under 
that Agreement, the law of Luxembourg applies.99 In its relationship with the supplier of a 
chargeable app, Apple has the status of a “commissaire” under the law of Luxembourg, 
which is comparable to that of a German “commission agent” pursuant to section 383 et 
seqq. of the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB) who acts in his own 
name for another’s account.100 In the case of free apps, Apple is the supplier’s “legal agent”. 
When it comes to sales to end consumers in Germany, Apple is therefore a “commissaire” 
under the law of Luxembourg.101 From the supplier’s perspective, the App Store is the 
consumer’s contracting partner (distributer).  
However, the contract between the App Store and the supplier (the iOS Agreement) conflicts 
with that between the App Store and the consumer (the iTunes terms). Consumers will 
probably feel that they are concluding a contract with the supplier. However, no reference is 
made anywhere to the fact that a contract is to be concluded with the supplier, which is why 
consumers can ultimately assume that they have only concluded a contract with the App 
Store.102 In the end it is not clear who the contracting party is, which will, in turn, have 
consequences in the event of a liability case.  
Unequivocal legal situation on account of the Apple App Store’s terms and conditions 
The legal uncertainties increase when one analyses the Apple App Store’s Terms of Use.103 
They refer to German law,104 which is why section 305 et seqq. of the German Civil Code is 
applicable.  
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However, it is not, for instance, clear whether the terms regarding the downloading of 
individual apps are actually incorporated pursuant to section 305 of the German Civil Code or 
whether they represent a framework agreement within the meaning of section 305 (3) of that 
Code. Both options are inconclusive. On the one hand, the terms cannot apply to the 
purchase of individual apps because they are only shown to consumers once when they 
create an iTunes account for the Apple App Store. When purchasing individual apps they are 
neither shown again nor is reference made to them. If one assumes that each time an 
individual app is downloaded a new contract is concluded with the App Store, then the Terms 
of Use are not effectively incorporated for any of these individual contracts for the Apple App 
Store.105 On the other hand, classifying the terms as a framework agreement which then 
applies to the purchase of each app is also inconclusive:106 If that were the case, then Apple 
would have to make explicit reference to the Terms of Use and to the fact that these will 
apply each time an app is downloaded when a consumer opens an iTunes account. Taking 
the consumer’s perspective, it can be assumed that merely creating “access” does not mean 
concluding a framework agreement for all subsequent app downloads. However, it is not only 
unclear that the Terms of Use are being incorporated and to which contract they are 
applicable (creating an iTunes account or downloading an app), the effectiveness of the 
terms themselves is also unclear (even if one assumes that they had been effectively 
incorporated). Two problems are striking here: the confusing nature of the Terms of Use and 
the limitations on liability. 
What is clear is that the App Store’s terms not only refer to the mobile App Store, but also to 
the iTunes Stores, the Mac App Store, the App Store for Apple TV, the iBook Store and the 
Apple Music Service. A document which, depending on its format, can run to around 20 
pages contains terms and conditions for six different Apple services; paragraphs are not 
numbered. Various topics are intermingled and the document is extremely confusing.  
4. Current state of the debate on a reform of platforms 
The focus in the following will be on two reform proposals: First, France has submitted 
various bills to the European Commission in the notification procedure under Directive 
2015/1535/EU107 and the now amended Directive 98/34/EC.108 Second, the Research Group 
on the Law of Digital Services (RG Digital Services) has published a Discussion Draft of a 
Directive on Online Intermediary Platforms.109  
Information asymmetries 
Articles 19 and 20 of the French Digital Republic Bill concern general information 
requirements incumbent on online portals. Accordingly, a platform110  
“shall be obliged to provide trustworthy, clear and transparent information on the 
general terms and conditions of use for the intermediation service they provide 
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and on the arrangements for referencing, classifying and dereferencing content, 
goods or services to which this service provides access. They must clearly show 
whether there is a contractual relationship or capital links with those referenced, 
whether there is any compensation by those referenced and, where applicable, 
the impact of this on how content, goods or services offered are classified.” 
Article 21 of the Digital Republic Bill specifically concerns rating portals.111 Under the 
provision, which is to be incorporated into the French Consumer Code,  
“any person involved in the activity of collecting, moderating or distributing consumer 
opinions online, as the main party or an accessory, is obliged to issue truthful, clear 
and transparent information on the methods used to check the opinions posted online. 
They shall specify whether or not the opinions that they have posted online have been 
checked and, if they have, indicate the main characteristics of the checks performed.” 
The Bill is to be given concrete form in a decree on information requirements specifically for 
comparison websites.112 Under this draft, all comparison websites must specify in a directly 
and easily accessible dedicated section how the comparison service works. It must include 
the following information: (1) the different ranking criteria of offers of goods and services and 
their definition; (2) the existence or non-existence of a contractual relationship or capital links 
between the comparison site and the professionals listed; (3) the existence or non-existence 
of any payment to the site by the professionals listed and, where appropriate, the impact 
thereof on the ranking of offers; (4) details of the cost components and the possibility that 
additional charges will be added; (5) if applicable, the differences between the commercial 
guarantees of the products compared; (6) completeness or non-completeness of the offers 
for goods or services compared and the number of listed sites or businesses; (7) the 
updating time frame and method of offers compared. Information is also to be displayed on 
each comparison results page, namely the ranking criteria and, in particular, whether or not a 
fee is charged for the listing (“linking”).  
According to the expert evaluators, the European Commission contradicted the bills, but 
without publishing its opposing opinion. The Commission essentially criticised the fact that 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and the E-Commerce Directive stood in the way of 
existing and fully harmonised legal frameworks. Irrespective of the issue of full 
harmonisation, which can be made out here, it is doubtful what purpose further information 
requirements could actually serve. The meaningfulness of information requirements has not 
been proven,113 and it is doubtful whether the French Bill will have a sustainable impact on 
platform economics. It does, however, appear to make sense as regards identifying the 
contracting party. 
A draft of a Platform Directive is also currently being discussed in the literature. The RG 
Digital Services is leading the way and has put forward a Draft Directive.114 The Research 
Group proposes including certain disclosure requirements, in the same way as the French 
Bill does. The authors propose introducing information requirements in respect of details of 
the contractual relationships between the consumer, supplier and platform operator. The 
proposal leaves it open how that information is to be provided. One possible solution, in the 
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case of a platform with user accounts, would be that attention would have to be drawn to the 
information in a separate step when an account was being created, for example by means of 
pictogrammes or governmental rating systems.  
Definition of “platform” 
The French Bill proposes the following definition:  
“Under the terms of this Article, online platforms are deemed to be activities 
consisting of classifying or referencing content, goods or services offered or 
uploaded by third parties, or of electronically connecting several parties with a 
view to selling goods or providing services (including free of charge), or 
exchanging or sharing goods or services. Persons exercising this activity in a 
professional capacity are qualified as online platforms.”115  
Article 2 of the RG Digital Services’ proposal contains the following definition, however:  
“‛online intermediary platform’ means an information society service accessible 
through the Internet or by similar digital means which enables customers to 
conclude contracts with suppliers of goods, services or digital content. This does 
not include services which only identify relevant suppliers and which direct 
customers to those suppliers’ websites or contact details.”116  
The Research Group’s suggestion thus has rather limited scope: the connecting factor is the 
platform as the place of conclusion of the contract. This means that ratings platforms would 
not fall under the scope of application of the legislation because the contract between the 
consumer and supplier is generally concluded in the real world. In the end, what is required 
is a very nuanced regulation applicable to a small number of platforms. In the light of Article 8 
of the proposed directive that is regrettable, because this provision on rating systems could 
easily be applied to ratings platforms.  
Liability issues  
The problem of the liability of intermediaries is not new to the legal system. A medieval 
market place could be described as an intermediary which brought together supply and 
demand. Special rules apply for brokers and for intermediaries under travel law and in the 
case of financial services. Nevertheless, it appears appropriate to seek a separate solution 
for Internet portals. Unlike in their relationships with brokers, travel agents or credit 
intermediaries, consumers often do not pay a portal anything and do not even conclude a 
contract of use. Dealings on Internet platforms cannot be compared with a broad brush to 
agency business either since the context of platform economics is missing. Securities and 
insurance markets pose a much greater risk to consumers than the overwhelming majority of 
Internet platforms do.  
The RG Digital Services’ proposal for a directive addresses various liability options and 
duties to protect.117 When it comes to the platform operator’s own duties to protect 
consumers, Article 7 of the proposal suggests that the platform operator be obliged to 
immediately pass on all communication between the consumer and the supplier if it provides 
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a general system of communication on the platform. Under Article 7(2) of the proposal, when 
consumers have access to the platform operator they also have access to the supplier. That 
seems to make sense, since it ought not to be possible for the platform operator to thwart the 
supplier’s information requirements. The platform operator’s position of power is thus also 
appropriately limited. To protect platform users (both consumers and suppliers), Article 9 of 
the proposal requires that platform operators must intervene where the operator learns of 
any criminal behaviour or behaviour which interferes with users’ physical integrity, privacy, 
property or liberty. That represents a generous extension of obligations compared to the E-
Commerce Directive, which only concerns liability for information which is transmitted. The 
liability gap would thus have been closed.  
Further, the proposal provides for a specific liability system for platform operators. The basic 
standard is set out in Article 16(1) of the proposal: Whoever only presents himself as an 
intermediary is not liable. Exceptions are listed in Articles 17 to 20. Under Article 18, the 
platform operator is jointly liable if the operator exercises special influence on the supplier. 
Article 19 lays down liability in the event of the platform operator making damaging, 
misleading statements about consumers, suppliers, the goods or services offered, and digital 
content. Article 20 brilliantly rounds off the liability system and demands liability for 
guarantees which the platform operator gives regarding the supplier/consumer or 
goods/services offered.  
Outlook 
Of what value are the liability rules contained in the Research Group’s proposal? On the one 
hand, the proposed directive presents quite a balanced liability regime: It introduces no 
general responsibility on the part of the platform operator, but distinguishes between different 
cases. Article 14 could be sufficient as regards identifying suppliers on platforms.118 
Comparisons with travel law are obvious:119 Article 13(1)(2) of the Package Travel 
Directive120 provides for the possibility of the travel agent being liable for providing the 
contractually agreed package travel services. The proposals are reminiscent of the concept 
of linked contracts under section 358 et seqq. of the German Civil Code. In fact the contract 
concluded between a supplier and consumer is based on the platform operator providing the 
required virtual environment, whereby the platform operator becomes the indispensible 
intermediary.121 
Instead of expanding the platform operators’ own duties to protect as well as liability, one 
option would be to impose monitoring and control obligations. That way platform operators 
would not be elevated to the position of partner in liability but more to the rank of “contact 
person”. To do that the system of exemptions applied in the E-Commerce Directive would 
have to be amended. One possibility – which the European Commission also addresses in 
its Guidance on the Implementation/Application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 
Commercial Practices122 – would be to introduce an obligation to shape the platform’s 
structures in such a way as to enable, or even force, them to conform to consumer protection 
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law – Article 14 of the Research Group’s proposal for a directive is thus to be endorsed. If a 
supplier is forced during the registration process to provide information under consumer 
protection law, then the platform can easily monitor compliance. If a platform is unlawful in 
terms of its structure, consumer organisations, which are responsible for enforcing rights, 
would have a direct point of contact. The platform operator would have fewer risks to contend 
with than in the case of the above-mentioned proposal for a real platform directive.  
III. Consumer data protection 
It is impossible to discuss the Internet of Things and the law of digital services without going 
into data protection law.123 A Privacy Sweep by the Global Privacy Enforcement Network124 in 
which 25 different data protection authorities investigated how enterprises communicate their 
privacy policies to consumers found “alarming” shortfalls for more than 300 Internet of Things 
devices. In particular, they did not provide consumers with sufficient information about how 
their personal information was collected and processed nor about their rights in this respect. 
Data protection plays a key role on various levels in the context of the provision of digital 
services. Substantive law problems arise which are in part structurally similar to the contract 
law problems which arise in the context of digital services (e.g. the packaging of offers with 
data or the monitoring of terms in privacy notices). Problems specific to data protection law 
are primarily the erosion of the need for consent and guaranteed data protection in 
international data traffic. A discussion of the inconclusive level of protection in regard to 
transnational transactions leads into an explanation of the consequences of 
deterritorialisation in regard to digital consumer law (see IV. below.). 
1. Prohibition of coupling 
If consent to the processing of one’s personal data is formulated as a binding condition for 
contract performance although the data processor does not actually need the data for that 
purpose, then the voluntariness of that consent pursuant to Article 7(4) and Recital 43 of the 
General Data Protection Regulation is called into question. Article 7(4) of the Regulation 
goes beyond section 28 (3b) of the Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, 
BDSG),125 which only concerns the coupling of consent to address trading and advertising 
with the conclusion of a contract. 
This means it is disputable whether the prohibition of coupling in fact prohibits “paying” with 
one’s data.126 It must be considered whether the protection of the general right of personality 
pursued in the Federal Data Protection Act by means of a prohibition subject to approval 
possibly permits data protection law and fair trading law to be treated differently (the latter 
being concerned with the misleading of market participants).127 
2. Monitoring of terms and conditions in privacy notices 
Privacy notices are subject to monitoring because they are generally presented to and 
accepted by consumers in a formulaic manner and consumers are often in a structurally 
weaker negotiating position. Where one party is in a weaker position, under data protection 
law the voluntariness of consent within the meaning of section 4 of the Federal Data 
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Protection Act is called into question. The prohibition of coupling means that low-level 
pressure is to be avoided. Pressure can also arise independently of any linking of access to 
digital services with the consumer’s personal data, for example when a consumer has to act 
within a short timeframe. 
The fact that privacy notices can be monitored under the law of general terms and conditions 
shows that some clauses could be ineffective pursuant to sections 307 and 308 of the 
German Civil Code as they, one-sidedly, oblige consumers to review and monitor amended 
clauses and place consumers at an inappropriate disadvantage because they are unaware 
that their data are being passed on to third parties.128  
3. Personal nature of data and data protection by technology 
In principle, the question here is to what extent digital service providers may collect personal 
data from consumers and to what rules that collection of data is subject. This is, in particular, 
relevant when consumers “pay” with their data for what is ostensibly a free service. Where 
service providers anonymise consumer data, the Federal Data Protection Act is no longer 
applicable. If the data are not anonymised, for example because they are pseudonymised or 
directly personal, the collection and processing of these data are subject to the provisions of 
the Federal Data Protection Act. 
Of relevance here is the potential of technology models which can guarantee data protection 
in the Internet, both in regard to digital services and the Internet of Things in general, above 
all privacy by design, certification, data protection compliance in enterprises etc. “Privacy by 
design” refers to account being taken of the protection of the private sphere when designing 
a device or service which “invades the private sphere”, in particular by means of built-in 
anonymisation methods. Alternatively, data are to be pseudonymised, which means that it is 
possible to trace the information back to a specific individual, for example to safeguard the 
interest in criminal prosecution. “Privacy by default” refers to basic technical or organisational 
settings aimed at effectively implementing data protection principles such as data 
minimisation and protecting the rights of data subjects. Both privacy by design and privacy by 
default have now been regulated in Article 25 of the General Data Protection Regulation. 
Generally speaking, it can be said that data protection by technical means is increasingly 
coming to the fore. 
4. Consent through “business purposes” 
One specific question which is raised in regard to digital services is that of the legitimacy of 
the data collection. Data collection and processing can be legitimised by means of consent 
pursuant to section 4 of the Federal Data Protection Act (Article 6(1)(a) of the General Data 
Protection Regulation) or section 28 of the Federal Data Protection Act (Article 6(1)(b) of the 
Regulation). Generally speaking, there is a danger that instead of choosing complicated 
solutions involving consent, enterprises will choose to expand data collection and processing 
via section 28 of the Federal Data Protection Act.129 Proliferated use of section 28 of the 
Federal Data Protection Act could erode the need for consent and the principle of data 
economy. It is not known to what extent the purpose cited in the privacy notice is in actual 
fact one which is required for contract performance. No empirical studies on this issue are 
yet available. 
5. International data transfers  
Safeguarding the protection of data transferred abroad is a consumer policy imperative. 
Various initiatives are hitting legal obstacles. The Safe Harbor Agreement between the EU 
and the United States of America was declared void by the European Court of Justice in a 
decision which caused quite a sensation.130 Its successor, the Privacy Shield, has already 
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come under criticism. On account of the numerous exceptions it contains it does not appear 
to provide an appropriate level of protection. The assumption that an appropriate level of 
protection is guaranteed when certification is voluntary risks coming to nothing. Data subjects 
have no effective means of enforcing their rights before the US courts. Another criticism 
which can be raised is that data protection authorities, including collective holders of rights, 
are excluded from arbitration.131 Data protection specialists criticise the contractual 
alternative, the “Export/Import Contract Template”, on which many enterprises (including 
Facebook) already base their international data transfers. The Irish Data Protection Authority 
is currently preparing a preliminary ruling procedure.132  
IV. Deterritorialisation and the enforcement of rights 
The enforcement of consumer rights rests on two well-established pillars and one which is 
still under construction. Individual redress forms the first pillar, collective redress, especially 
by consumer associations by way of a cease-and-desist order, the second. The third pillar, 
which is only beginning to take shape, is official redress; it is successively taking hold from 
the outside in, so to speak, from the European, transnational level down to the national, 
German level.  
The digitalisation of the economy, society and the law not only draws attention to the 
shortcomings of substantive law, but above all to those in institutions, procedures and 
instruments available for cross-border legal redress. Legal redress itself, especially questions 
around collective redress, has been discussed not only in Germany, but across Europe and 
the world for the past 20 years. Germany is very cautiously feeling its way towards new 
forms of collective redress. Nevertheless, this report does not address the enforcement of 
rights as such, or its opportunities and risks. The focus here is very specifically on the digital 
economy and digital society, specifically the peculiarities arising in the face of digitalisation 
when it comes to enforcing rights. 
1. Re the impact on consumer rights 
G. Spindler/Ch. Thorun refer in a report they submitted to the registered society 
Selbstregulierung Informationswirtschaft133 to the problems of legal redress as some of the 
key problems faced in the digital economy. Taking the micro perspective of legal 
relationships which consumers enter into in order to participate in the digital world, it appears 
that the decisive problem is the deterritorialisation of legal relationships and thus also the 
deterritorialisation of legal redress. 
Although there are no valid empirical surveys which could undermine this assessment, an 
analysis of the available academic literature does appear to suggest that consumers are 
bowing to reality: participation coupled with trust and fatalism. If consumers want to 
participate in the digital world, they not only have to hand over their personal data, they also 
embark on transactions in the course of which they cannot see which enterprises they are 
dealing with, what exactly the subject matter of the legal relationship is, let alone where these 
enterprises are based and how they will be able to enforce their rights if the enterprise is 
based in the EU or elsewhere outside of Europe. In its recent case-law, especially that 
referring to a cross-border context, the European Court of Justice speaks of “the consumer’s 
weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards in particular his level of 
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knowledge”.134 The idea is still prevalent that consumers inform themselves about their 
rights. In our specific context, consumers could find out about an enterprise’s terms and 
conditions.  
Assuming that terms and conditions are even available in German and also assuming that 
consumers actually read them, then they would recently have been able to learn the 
following about Amazon: 
“The law of Luxembourg applies, and the application of the United Nations 
Convention of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods is expressly 
excluded.” 
Following the ECJ’s judgment in the Amazon case, clause 14 of the Conditions of Use and 
Sale now read as follows: 
“These conditions are governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the application of the United Nations Convention of 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods is expressly excluded. We both agree to 
submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the district of Luxembourg City, 
which means that you may bring a claim to enforce your consumer protection rights in 
connection with these Conditions of Use in Luxembourg or in the EU country in which 
you live. The European Commission provides for an online dispute resolution platform, 
which you can access here: (...). If you would like to bring a matter to our attention, 
please contact us.” 
By contrast, the jurisdiction clauses cited in Facebook’s, Twitter’s and Google’s respective 
Terms of Service read as follows: 
Facebook: 
“You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute (claim) you have with us 
arising out of or relating to this Statement or Facebook exclusively in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California or a state court located in San 
Mateo County, and you agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of such courts 
for the purpose of litigating all such claims. The laws of the State of California will 
govern this Statement, as well as any claim that might arise between you and us, 
without regard to conflict of law provisions.” 
Twitter:  
“These Terms are an agreement between you and Twitter International 
Company, an Irish company with registered office at The Academy, 42 Pearse 
Street, Dublin 2, Ireland. If you have any questions about these Terms, please 
contact us.” 
Google:  
“These Terms and any disputes resulting from or in connection with them are 
subject to German law, excluding the United Nations Convention of Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods. This choice of law is of no consequence as 
regards the law which is applicable to the respective service. If you are a 
consumer, then statutory provisions apply for all disputes resulting from or in 
connection with these Terms. If you are not a consumer, the exclusive place of 
jurisdiction for all disputes resulting from or in connection with these Terms is 
Hamburg.” 
How meaningful is any of the above? The Amazon case will serve for a discussion of the 
problems involved. German customers of Amazon, Facebook and Twitter learn that it is not 
German law, but the law of Luxembourg, California or Ireland which applies. That may be 
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disconcerting, because it is not German law. Nevertheless, P. Rott135 asks, slightly ironically, 
in a discussion of the ECJ’s judgment whether consumers would be better informed if 
reference were made to German law, as is the case in Google’s Terms. The fact that the 
United Nations Convention of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods does not apply 
will mean very little to most consumers. In times in which behavioural research is all the rage, 
it would be very interesting to investigate what associations, hopes or fears a choice of law 
clause triggers. The Member States and the EU are working on the political level to convince 
consumers that the (as yet) 28 Member State legal systems are all equal. Consumers are to 
feel just as protected by the law of Luxembourg than by German law. Choosing German law 
may, therefore, have a calming effect, at any rate more calming than when consumers 
choose the law of Luxembourg. But what if US or Indian law were to apply and not the law of 
Luxembourg?  
Another interesting question from the consumer perspective would be whether, after 
choosing a legal system, they could waive their right to legal redress and, if so, how this ex-
ante waiver would influence the subject matter and volume of Internet transactions. Or put 
another way: Are consumers prepared, when German law applies, to order more and more 
valuable goods or services?  
In legal reality, the average consumer will not bother asking these sorts of questions. 
Obstacles in consumers’ path are “clicked away” so they can achieve their objective. 
Naturally, that sort of behaviour is highly rational. If consumers first had to find out about all 
the possible consequences, the time and effort they would have to invest would be much 
greater than the possible risk were difficulties to arise in the processing of an order. Waiving 
the right to legal redress is a necessary but also logical consequence. And all the more so 
since in countless cases transactions proceed smoothly. 
Despite all the trust consumers place in that enterprises behaving properly, together with a 
dash of fatalism, they are still left with a certain sense of unease. That takes on concrete 
shape where the potential risk exceeds a certain attention threshold, either on account of the 
nature of the problem (unsafe children’s toys) or on account of its prevalence (powerlessness 
in the face of transnationals’ privacy policies). How else would the case of Schrems v. Data 
Protection Officer136 have become so well-known across the world? This unease lies dormant 
and rises to the surface when an event reaches citizens at least on an emotional level. In that 
case, those organisations involved in enforcing consumer rights very quickly come into focus, 
as does the more or less overtly raised question of whether these organisations are doing 
enough to safeguard consumer rights beyond national boundaries, whether they are helping 
consumers to assert their rights or whether they are protecting them against possible 
damage through preventative monitoring. It is logical to assume that consumers, were they to 
be asked, would tend to be critical, above all if they were surveyed after a large-scale 
consumer policy incident.  
That is not to say that policy-makers in Germany and in the EU have not reacted in any way. 
In the course of integrating EU markets, policy-makers have responded by developing a 
whole arsenal of legal instruments which have one thing in common: They put the onus on 
the individual. Consumers are to assert their rights themselves, even beyond national 
borders. In cross-border legal disputes within the EU consumers are guaranteed that 
Germany is their place of jurisdiction, but not that German law will be applicable. The 
question is whether previous legal policy has achieved those goals it set out to achieve and 
whether the opportunities and possibilities available have actually improved. There is room 
for doubt, even though no robust data are yet available. That is the only explanation for why 
the EU is massively expanding individual legal redress below the court level and why it wants 
cross-border collective redress to be placed on a completely new footing. 
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2. Individual legal redress 
The shift away from courts to all sorts of different forms of alternative dispute resolution is 
nothing new. It is inherent to consumer law and, ultimately, a result of the objective that these 
forums are to make it easier and simpler for consumers to enforce their rights. However, this 
development has further accelerated with the rise of the digital economy.  
Online trading as a whole, regardless of the type of product or service offered, is permeated 
by voluntary dispute resolution on various levels, by associations in the relevant sector and 
arbitration and conciliation bodies.137 Ombudspeople have gained great significance for 
financial service providers. The entry into force on 1 April 2016 of the Consumer Dispute 
Resolution Act (Verbraucherstreitbeilegungsgesetz, VBSG) places what was up until then an 
extremely heterogeneous and complex system of voluntary dispute resolution in Germany on 
a uniform footing. The Federal Office of Justice has since published a list of recognised 
bodies.138 This was occasioned by two EU legislative acts: the Online Dispute Resolution 
(ODR) Regulation and the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Directive.139 
The basic idea is that all forms of dispute resolution are covered, both private and public, 
though excluding pure customer complaints bodies and other dispute resolution facilities run 
or funded only by a single enterprise or by associated enterprises, or active only on behalf of 
such enterprises or associated enterprises (section 1 (2) of the Consumer Dispute 
Resolution Act). The key question will be which of the diverse online trading mechanisms are 
covered by the exemption or whether operators, even if they could rely on the exemption, 
decide to upgrade or restructure. The entire system is in flux, and it will be interesting to see 
which path those involved will choose to take. It is not yet clear what will happen to 
conciliation offices recognised by Germany’s Land departments of justice.140 
The ODR platform is to become a first point of contact. Parties will propose various dispute 
resolution agencies or a complaint will be passed straight on to such an agency if the parties 
have previously reached agreement. The Member States will designate points of contact 
which are to notify the parties of which agency has been chosen. The whole of the 
subsequent procedure will be carried out online via the platform. Theoretically, this will result 
in new types of Europe-wide dispute resolution mechanisms which go well beyond the 
objective set out in the ODR Regulation. The provisions have been implemented in sections 
38 to 40 of the Consumer Dispute Resolution Act: Section 38 of the Act regulates 
cooperation between the consumer conciliation board and those institutions which are 
responsible for the out-of-court resolution of comparable disputes, in the implementation of 
the Directive in another Member State of the EU or EEA. Section 39 designates the 
consumer dispute resolution body responsible in its capacity as point of contact for 
cooperation in online disputes. Under section 40, the Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Consumer Protection assumes the obligation under EU law to support consumers in 
enforcing their rights. The Ministry can delegate this task to “a legal person under private law, 
a partnership with legal capacity or another suitable body”. Responsibility for professional 
and legal oversight remains with the Ministry.  
The flesh still needs to be added to the bare bones of these provisions. It will remain to be 
seen whether, in doing so, it will be possible to ensure that consumers in the EU and the 
EEA actually use the platform to resolve disputes without taking recourse to the courts. 
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However, digitalisation opens up new paths for enforcing rights which are reflected neither in 
EU law nor in German law. One such example is the enforcement of passenger rights with 
the help of commercial intermediaries who assert a consumer’s rights against payment of a 
percentage share.141 Several such providers exist.142 They generally only take on clear-cut 
cases. It is undeniable that they help many consumers to enforce their rights in cases where 
those consumers would probably not have taken on the matter themselves. That is why the 
success rate is so high and is relied on so heavily in advertising. The provider Flightright, for 
instance, only files claims for damages for flight delays under the corresponding Flight 
Compensation Regulation (EC) No 261/2004.143 Consumers are left to deal with the more 
risky cases themselves, though. They have to seek out a consumer advice centre or get a 
lawyer on the case. Such models are also conceivable in regard to either incorrect advice or 
incorrect information on a massive scale. Unequivocal legislative standards would, however, 
be needed which clearly define the preconditions for a claim for damages and leave no doubt 
as to calculating the amount of the damage. The EU legislature only laid down lump sums in 
the Flight Compensation Regulation.  
3. Cross-border collective redress 
The increase in cross-border trade was fostering the deterritorialisation of consumer 
problems long before the questions raised by the spread of digital technology were moved to 
the top of the political agenda. The focus has been on advertising practices and terms and 
conditions. The Member States have left it to the EU to develop uniform substantive 
standards, either minimum standards in the case of terms and conditions or maximum 
standards in the case of commercial practices. By creating the cease-and-desist order the 
EU set up a procedural “minimum standard under EU law” in parallel to substantive law.144 In 
accordance with the provisions of secondary EU law, each Member State is obliged to 
nominate a body having legal standing, either a consumer association and/or a consumer 
authority. Directive 98/27/EC (now Directive 2009/22/EC) raised legal redress by 
associations to the European level. It required the reciprocal recognition of legal standing, 
but left the Member States to delineate the legal interest in bringing proceedings. In the 
1990s the European Commission still had high hopes for consumer associations as civil 
society players. Taking the number of actions brought as a benchmark, the number of cross-
border suits has remained low in the EU. One exception is where neighbouring states speak 
the same language, as in the case of Belgium and France or Germany and Austria. 
The scientific effort involved in analysing the complex legal issues involved bears no relation 
to their practical relevance. Digitalisation has done nothing to change that either. Consumer 
associations file actions against unfair terms and conditions or unfair and misleading market 
practices by those enterprises which are felt to be the digital market leader in a particular 
country, despite the fact that substantive law is largely harmonised and despite the ability to 
initiate cross-border proceedings which enable associations to protect their consumers 
against legal violations committed in another EU Member State. One practical reason may 
be that today’s digital world is dictated by US corporations, which tend not to set up branches 
in every EU Member State. Jurisdiction clauses, arbitration clauses and choice-of-law 
agreements are problematical from the consumer perspective. Ryanair has opened up a new 
round in the debate because it now prohibits customers from assigning their rights under the 
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Flight Compensation Regulation to private companies which claim consumers’ entitlements 
to Europe-wide compensation of up to 600 euros against payment of a fixed percentage 
share. The details of these extremely complex issues and their relevance for consumers in 
Germany will be discussed in the following based on Amazon’s choice of law clause, which 
came to the attention of the Austrian consumer association.  
Internationally active companies need to decide whether they can get consumers in the EU 
to “choose” the law of the enterprise’s place of business via the terms and conditions and not 
by entering into individual agreements. In terms of the conflict of laws, enterprises need to 
find those Member States in which the choice of law made in the terms and conditions is 
permitted under the provisions of Article 3(5) of Rome I (Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of 17 
June 2008). To our knowledge there is no Member State which prohibits the choice of law 
per se. That would mean that, for all consumers in the EU, legal protection would initially be 
focused on an enterprise’s home state. The home state would thus be required to put in 
place substantive protection in the form of minimum standards applicable to that enterprise 
across the whole of the EU. Whether consumers in Member States other than the 
enterprise’s home state can continue to retain the protection provided by their home country 
legal system will depend on the favourability principle set out in Article 6(2) of Rome I. The 
Member States’ 28 legal systems would have to be compared on a substantive law level and 
implicitly or explicitly evaluated. The Member States as well as the European Commission 
have so far avoided undertaking such a “qualitative” comparison. Which legal system is the 
“best”? What criteria will make a legal system “better” in regard to minimum harmonisation 
and full harmonisation? Who is to compare each of the legal systems with the other 27? 
These are legally complex and politically sensitive issues which very quickly reveal the limits 
of what is feasible.  
But more is at stake. Procedurally speaking, by permitting the choice of law to be defined in 
the terms and conditions, an enterprise’s home state is saddled with implementing minimum 
standards under EU law for consumers across the whole of the EU. In a federal state such 
as Germany, this consequence is laid down in the constitution. This may or may not be 
desirable within the EU. Unlike substantive law, the favourability principle does not apply to 
procedural law. The EU’s legal system and the European Court of Justice assume that 
procedural rules are on principle equal. This principle has run right through the ECJ’s case-
law since the Brussels Agreement entered into force in 1980. The ECJ’s power of 
interpretation as regards the conflict of laws (Rome I and Rome II, prior to that the Rome 
Convention of 19 June 1980, effective since 1 April 1991)145 is more recent. The limits to 
national autonomy when it comes to shaping the procedure result from the principle of 
equivalence and effectiveness.146 
But what if it were to emerge that one Member State had to carry the full burden of legal 
protection for all EU consumers? Would the other Member States have to fund that Member 
State’s body with legal standing? Would consumer organisations have to cooperate across 
borders? Would they have to, and could they if they had to? Would there be any obligation 
under EU law to cooperate loyally well beyond the context of Regulation 2006/2004? What 
about where, due to under-funding, legal redress is made “significantly more difficult” or 
“virtually impossible”, for example in Germany (terms applied in the ECJ’s case-law since 
1976)147 because the body only exists on paper? Would subsidiary national jurisdiction in the 
consumer’s home country then apply? And how would that kind of factual situation, which 
does not appear so far-fetched given the realities of consumer procedural law in Europe,148 fit 
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with the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law? Could, should and would consumer 
associations have to file actions in Strasbourg, arguing that they were unable to assert their 
right to a hearing in accordance with the law? 
In the cross-border context the legal situation in regard to the right to representative action 
gets even more complex because there may be a discrepancy between procedural and 
substantive law, at any rate when the right to representative action is subjected to the logic of 
the conflict of laws, which Article 1(2) of Directive 98/27/EC (Article 2(2) of Directive 2009/22) 
appears to do. Where conflict-of-law rules lead back to the enterprise’s home state, the 
association bringing the action has to examine whether the substantive requirements in the 
chosen law on monitoring terms and conditions deviate from the home country’s law to the 
consumer’s detriment. Apart from the purely practical difficulty, who will take on this task? An 
association based in the consumer’s home country or a court based in the home country? Or 
an expert commissioned by the association or the court, who will be paid by whom? The 
question is to what extent national bodies with legal standing are being “put off” such an 
interpretation of conflict-of-law rules when it comes to enforcing rights. The fatal 
consequence as regards legal redress would, in the extreme case, be that the association 
which is in principle competent and authorised does not file an action because it feels that 
proceedings in the home country, as defined under another EU Member State’s law, are too 
time-consuming and expensive and the association in the enterprise’s home state, which 
also has legal standing, does not act because it lacks the incentive and resources to want to 
enforce consumer rights across the whole of the EU. Legal protection would in practice only 
be provided where the applicable law was the domestic law of the association with legal 
standing.  
In its Amazon ruling the European Court of Justice did not prohibit choice of law clauses but 
linked their permissibility to the condition that entrepreneurs must notify consumers in their 
terms and conditions of the fact that they retain what may possibly be a greater level of legal 
protection in their home country even if another EU Member State’s legal system has been 
chosen. In this ruling the ECJ offered consumer associations and consumers stones not 
bread. Consumer associations are invited to initiate more proceedings in order to find out 
how far the enterprises’ disclosure requirement goes. The Advocate General answered the 
extremely delicate question of whether entrepreneurs are now required to compare 28 legal 
systems and to inform consumers in a targeted manner in the negative; the ECJ, however, 
left the question open. It seems hard to believe that the ECJ is saddling enterprises with this 
burden. That would mean that the reference to the fact that better rights continue to exist in 
the home country only needs to be phrased quite generally. Consumers will then find a 
reference in the terms and conditions which means very little or nothing at all to them. It 
would then be better if they were to read that they are better off in EU Member State X than 
in EU Member State Y. The parallelism between the right of representative action against 
terms and conditions and individual proceedings, which the ECJ announced with so much 
verve, results in consumers being left to their own devices when it comes to enforcing their 
rights. The only thing which would help consumers would be if they were given a clear, 
uniform solution which they could then work with. What we are left with is a not insignificant 
amount of legal uncertainty as regards the extent of information which needs to be included 
in terms and conditions and as regards the relevance of the favourability principle in 
individual redress proceedings.  
Digitalisation permits the exact opposite, namely collective redress of consumer rights to be 
more efficiently organised, specifically when it comes to registering claims, the possibility of 
standardisation and information collection. That presupposes that consumers have the 
required access and digital skills to be able to enforce their rights and that institutions have 
digital skills and digital infrastructure at their disposal. Dovetailing the existing legal world 
with the digital world is a structural imperative. This development is still in its infancy, 
especially since the legislature has still not created the preconditions for collective redress. 
The only possible option would be to use digital technology to open up the option of class 
actions. 
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4. Cross-border cooperation between authorities 
At the turn of the millennium a hiatus in European consumer policy left deep marks in EU 
statutory law. Since the Lisbon Summit in 2000, EU consumer law and consumer policy have 
been under the aegis of economic efficiency. The outward sign of this is the swing from 
minimum to full harmonisation effected in Directive 2005/29/EC, which, against resistance 
from Germany, created a special rule for consumer-oriented advertising. Neglecting to 
include associations’ right of collective action in the restructured European international 
private law in Rome I and Rome II is further evidence. The fact that no political decision was 
taken on where to place collective redress within the overall system meant that in the 
Amazon case the ECJ had to make a decision which was of wide-ranging relevance when it 
comes to determining responsibilities for the monitoring of terms and conditions in the Single 
Market.149 
Viewed in retrospect, however, another document is of much greater relevance as regards 
the increasingly powerful trend within the EU towards consumer protection by authorities, 
and that is Regulation 2006/2004 on cross-border cooperation in consumer protection. The 
Regulation obliges Member States and thus also Germany to nominate a government 
institution which bears lead responsibility for this cooperation. In Germany, cross-border 
cooperation is coordinated by the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 
which acts in the capacity of central liaison office. The Ministry generally passes the requests 
for administrative assistance it receives from other countries to other agencies within 
Germany for review. Where applicable, these issue a warning or file a legal action. In 
addition to the Ministry, the Federal Aviation Office, the Federal Finance Supervisory 
Authority, the Federal Railway Authority and various federal state authorities are involved. 
Germany invested a great deal of energy in these negotiations to ensure that consumer 
associations (and the Central Office for the Prevention of Unfair Competition) are likewise 
involved. These bodies are primarily commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Consumer Protection where actions are to be brought against German enterprises in the 
interests of consumers in other EU Member States. 
However one wishes to rate this cooperation, it marks a turning point. Germany and Austria 
are the only Member States which have no governmental authority responsible for monitoring 
abusive terms and conditions and unfair advertising but where these matters are decided in 
the courts.  
There is little in the way of concrete details concerning the practical relevance of this 
procedure, which was introduced 10 years ago.150 The network has no doubt fostered cross-
border information sharing and thus also the ability to identify those consumer issues which 
are of cross-border relevance. Regulation 2006/2004 has not led to any more legal actions 
being brought than before, although that was a theoretical possibility. It is, likewise, not 
known what concrete successes the Regulation has achieved in helping consumers to 
enforce their rights. Following an evaluation of the previous Regulation, the European 
Commission on 25 May 2016 proposed fundamentally expanding the competencies of those 
authorities responsible for cross-border cooperation.151 The Proposal, whose future is 
                                                      
149
 See Micklitz/Reich, “Das IPR der Verbraucherverbandsklage gegen missbräuchliche AGB”, (2015), 
Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht, Vol. 4, p. 181–193; this is a report commissioned by the 
Association for Consumer Information (VKI) which was included in the proceedings. While Advocate 
General Saugmandsgaard shares our legal opinion, in Case C-191/15 VKI v. Amazon, EU:C:2016:388 
the ECJ saddles consumers and national courts with the task of finding out whether, in an individual 
case, national law provides greater protection than that “chosen” in the terms and conditions. 
150
 Rott, Rechtsvergleichende Aspekte der behördlichen Durchsetzung von Verbraucherschutz, Report 
submitted to the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, file no. V B1-7008-3-3-52 
24/2016. 
151
 COM(2016), 283 final. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, 
<https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/DE/1-2016-283-DE-F1-1.PDF> (last retrieved 
28 Nov. 2016). 
42 
 
uncertain, would strengthen official redress, especially in regard to instruments required to 
assert rights which are now for the first time to include a rule on compensation. Authorities 
would be given the possibility, within the scope of the Regulation, of also compensating 
consumers’ collective damages. The Proposal focuses in particular on the digital economy. 
The relevant passages in this context are highlighted in the following.152 
Article 8  
Minimum powers of competent authorities  
1. Each competent authority shall have the investigation and enforcement powers 
necessary for the application of this Regulation and shall exercise them in 
accordance with this Regulation and national law.  
2. Each competent authority shall have at least the following powers and exercise 
them under the conditions set out in Article 9, to:  
(a) have access to any relevant document, data or information related to 
an infringement under this Regulation, in any form or format and 
irrespective of the medium on which or the place where they are 
stored;  
(b) require the supply by any natural or legal person, including banks, 
internet service providers, domain registries and registrars and hosting 
service providers of any relevant information, data or document in any 
format or form and irrespective of the medium on which or the place 
where they are stored, for the purpose of among others identifying and 
following financial and data flows, or of ascertaining the identity of persons 
involved in financial and data flows, bank account information and 
ownership of websites;  
(c) require any public authority, body or agency within the Member State 
of the competent authority to supply any relevant information, data or 
document in any format or form and irrespective of the medium on 
which or the place where they are stored, for the purpose among others, 
of identifying and following of financial and data flows, or of ascertaining 
the identity of persons involved in financial and data flows, bank account 
information and ownership of websites;  
(d) carry out the necessary on-site inspections, including in particular the 
power to enter any premises, land or means of transport or to request 
other authorities to do so in order to examine, seize, take or obtain copies 
of information, data or documents, irrespective of the medium on which 
they are stored; to seal any premises or information, data or documents 
for a necessary period and to the extent necessary for the inspection; to 
request any representative or member of the staff of the trader concerned 
to give explanations on facts, information or documents relating to the 
subject matter of the inspection and to record the answers;  
(e) purchase goods or services as test purchases in order to detect 
infringements under this Regulation and obtain evidence;  
(f) purchase goods or services under a cover identity in order to detect 
infringements and to obtain evidence;  
(g) adopt interim measures to prevent the risk of serious and irreparable 
harm to consumers, in particular the suspension of a website, domain 
or a similar digital site, service or account;  
(h) start investigations or procedures to bring about the cessation or 
prohibition of intra-Union infringements or widespread infringements of its 
own initiative and where appropriate to publish information about this;  
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(i) obtain a commitment from the trader responsible for the intra-Union 
infringement or widespread infringement to cease the infringement and 
where appropriate to compensate consumers for the harm caused;  
(j) request in writing the cessation of the infringement by the trader;  
(k) bring about the cessation or the prohibition of the infringement;  
(l) close down a website, domain or similar digital site, service or 
account or a part of it, including by requesting a third party or other public 
authority to implement such measures;  
(m) impose penalties, including fines and penalty payments, for intra-
Union infringements and widespread infringements and for the failure to 
comply with any decision, order, interim measure, commitment or other 
measure adopted pursuant to this Regulation;  
(n) order the trader responsible for the intra-Union infringement or 
widespread infringement to compensate consumers that have 
suffered harm as a consequence of the infringement including, 
among others, monetary compensation, offering consumers the 
option to terminate the contract or other measures ensuring redress 
to consumers who have been harmed as a result of the infringement;  
(o) order the restitution of profits obtained as a result of 
infringements, including an order that those profits are paid to the 
public purse or to a beneficiary designated by the competent 
authority or under national legislation;  
(p) publish any final decisions, interim measures or orders, including the 
publication of the identity of the trader responsible for the intra-Union 
infringement or widespread infringement;  
(q) consult consumers, consumer organisations, designated bodies 
and other persons concerned about the effectiveness of the proposed 
commitments in ceasing the infringement and removing the harm 
caused by it.  
The fate of the Proposal is not yet known. The fact remains that, should it ever be 
implemented in this or a similar form, it would perhaps for the first time provide the 
opportunity to adequately respond to the deterritorialisation of consumer problems in the 
digital world and to create a European equivalent to the US class action. 
V. Potential solutions as regards the law of digital services 
Any potential solution must above all be geared to maintaining consumers’ autonomy in the 
digital world – during the contract negotiation phase, when a contract is being concluded, 
throughout the often long contract term as well as after the contract has been terminated. 
What is needed is a holistic approach which is not concerned with thinking inside legal 
boxes, but where sensible solutions are sought to real problems. It is clear that in such an 
analysis there will be a certain amount of intermixing of private law and public law, of 
substantive law (data protection law, the law of terms and conditions, fair trading law and 
consumer contract law) with procedural law (individual and collective redress at national and 
international level).  
A survey of the current situation reveals a number of serious problems which existing 
legislation cannot solve. Consumers face completely new forms of distribution. Suppliers link 
the sale of a product to the software needed to use it. These package offers (see no. 2 
below) impede competition, that is if it is to be possible or desirable for suppliers to compete 
for the different parts. Transparency as regards the costs of such package offers is not 
required. Access is linked to the disclosure of personal data, which can only be processed 
with consumers’ consent. Consumers generally give their consent, regardless of the content 
and extent of the legal requirements, which have increased on account of the General Data 
Protection Regulation. The scope, extent and reach of such consent are not generally 
obvious and even if they are made transparent, they are hard to grasp in terms of their 
dimensions (see no. 3 below). Seventy-five years ago, it was believed that a review of 
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incorporation of terms would be enough to get a grip on terms and conditions, which were 
getting out of hand at the time.153 Considering the increased requirements being made of 
consent to data processing, history is now repeating itself.  
Once consumers have paid for access to the Internet and digital services with their data, 
question after question arises regarding the legal relationships they have entered into (see 
no. 1 below). Is there even a legal relationship? If so, of what kind? Is it a contract or a legal 
relationship sui generis? In the case of online business, who is the contracting party (see no. 
4 below)? Where is the contracting party domiciled? What is the subject matter of the 
contract (see no. 5 below) if it is not the transfer of ownership but only the use of a right?154 
What options are there for getting out of a contract once it has been concluded, given that it 
may have a ten-year term? Is it technically possible to extract the consumer’s data from the 
database of those enterprises which are processing these data? What rights does the 
consumer have vis-à-vis whom (see no. 6 below) when something goes wrong? Against the 
seller/supplier, who is often domiciled in another European country? How can those rights be 
asserted before a German court with the help of dispute resolution forums? Who is 
controlling whether everything is above board in this digital world? 
The model laid down in law provides that consumer associations are meant to handle those 
cases which consumers cannot manage themselves or by means of individual redress 
mechanisms (see no. 7 and no. 8 below). Consumer associations are supposed to be in 
charge of monitoring market practices and terms and conditions across all enterprises (and 
borders). They not only need the know-how to be able to apply legal provisions, but also to 
understand and categorise the technical processes which are behind the law of digital 
services. This policy approach is not flanked by a class action which the consumer 
associations or individual consumers or lawyers acting on behalf of consumers could use to 
file for compensation when things go wrong. The most important and most widespread 
means of collective redress is a cease-and desist-order, a stop-order mechanism which is 
limited to banning illegal practices ex nunc, but which again leaves it, cum grano salis, to 
each individual consumer to know how and whether they are going to claim damages from 
an entrepreneur who is acting illegally. The cautious approaches to safeguarding collective 
consumer interests by administrative means adopted by the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority and the Federal Network Agency and in cross-border matters by official EU and 
OECD networks may signal that a paradigm shift is underway. Currently, though, no suitable 
complement to private-law consumer protection is available to consumer authorities with 
general competencies, especially when it comes to compensating affected consumers.155 
The Advisory Council feels there is an urgent need to adapt existing rules to the challenges 
of the digital world. Taking the holistic perspective – from establishing a legal relationship to 
leaving a digital legal relationship – the Advisory Council proposes the following 11 measures 
which cover four different types of digital legal relationship.156 These measures are based on 
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the principle of legal clarity and legal certainty for consumers, a sufficient but also necessary 
condition for maintaining the autonomy of consumers.157 
The following list includes only those key demands which we feel need to be urgently 
actioned. It also includes policy-advisory considerations regarding implementation of the 
recommendations (see nos 9 to 11). The reasons as well as further details can be found in 
the relevant parts of this report, the third-party report commissioned by the Advisory Council 
and in the working papers to which reference is made.  
1. Re information provided before establishing a legal relationship 
Before establishing a legal relationship consumers are inundated with a wealth of 
information. Numerous statutory information and disclosure requirements are supposed to 
ensure that consumers become aware of the consequences under data protection law, that 
they are familiarised with the subject matter of the contract and all the contractual rights and 
obligations under the terms and conditions, and that they realise the extent and scope of the 
end-user agreement. The Advisory Council feels that the rules on information provision need 
to be more clearly structured, they need to be reduced in number where possible and 
compliance ensured by means of sanctioning mechanisms.  
Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
November 2014 on key information documents for packaged retail products and insurance-
based investment products (PRIIPs) can serve as the model. The draft of an Ordinance on 
Promoting Transparency in the Telecommunications Market (TC Transparency Ordinance)158 
is also on the right track. Both the Regulation and the Ordinance stipulate that enterprises 
uniformly use the prescribed sample information documents. Administrative sanctions can be 
imposed against any breaches and the provision of erroneous information can lead to civil-
law liability. Information on data protection, terms and conditions, and the end-user 
agreement should be provided in a standardised form which should be structured together 
with business and consumer associations. The extent and the linguistic comprehensibility of 
the information should be geared to readers’ cognitive abilities. New designs should be 
employed.  
Digital legal relationships are intended to be permanent. This most definitely applies to “as is” 
services, which cover a broad spectrum of services ranging from Google to social networks. 
Consumer rights can only be upheld if additional safeguards are incorporated for the duration 
of the legal relationship and in the event of its termination. In view of the key nature of the 
information provided in the information documents, consumers must be given the option of 
withdrawing from the contract if changes are made. Their attention must be drawn to this 
fact. In cases where the contract is continued over a number of years with the consumer’s 
agreement, that consumer should be given the option of requiring the entrepreneur to 
provide an update in which all the changes are summarised in an information document and 
made available to them. 
The Advisory Council recommends: (1) Before the contract is concluded the 
entrepreneur must inform consumers on one page in each case (500 words) about the 
relevant data protection requirements and about the terms and conditions. This 
obligation also applies when changes are made during the contract term. The 
entrepreneur must use typographic means to clearly highlight any subsequent 
changes on the one-page information document. The one-page information document 
and any updates are to be transmitted to consumers on a durable medium within the 
meaning of section 126b of the German Civil Code. (2) Each change entitles the 
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consumer to withdraw from the contract, to which reference must be made. (3) 
Sanctions must be imposed against breaches of the duty to include such a reference. 
2. Re package offers (including services) when concluding a contract 
Electronic devices which provide access to the Internet are generally offered in conjunction 
with pre-installed software. Consumers can only access the services available on the Internet 
after registering. There’s no such thing as a free lunch, not even on the Internet. It is decisive 
for a functioning market economy for consumers to be aware of each individual cost item, 
such as the price of the electronic device, the price of the software and the “price” of the 
supposedly free service. The only objective of competition policy is to “unpack” the various 
services as far as possible. If such unpacking is not possible, consumers should at least be 
aware of the aforementioned costs for the various services. Where third parties are paying 
for advertising, their contribution to the financing is to be clearly indicated. 
The Advisory Council recommends introducing the following information 
requirements: (1) When consumers purchase an electronic device with pre-installed 
software, they must be (separately) informed about the price of the device and of the 
software. The case-law of the European Court of Justice, which requires the opposite, 
must be adjusted by way of an amendment to the EU Directive. (2) Where third parties 
are financing digital services this must be disclosed to consumers. 
3. Re the scope and legal effects of consent  
Article 4 no. 11 of the General Data Protection Regulation sets out the substantive 
requirements made of the consent which consumers must give; that consent does not, 
however, necessarily have to be explicit, it can also be given by implication or in the terms 
and conditions. In the latter case, the principle of transparency and separation under the 
provisions of Article 7(2) of the General Data Protection Regulation applies, which goes 
further than the existing law of general terms and conditions. The basic idea behind the rule 
in the General Data Protection Regulation should be transferred to the law of general terms 
and conditions.159 It is not apparent why greater requirements are made of consent to data 
processing than of consent to terms and conditions. 
Information regarding the terms and conditions must be provided in a one-page information 
document; consumers can agree by ticking a box, as has previously been the case.160  
The Advisory Council recommends: Data protection requirements and requirements 
as regards terms and conditions for consent are to be put on an equal footing. The 
principle of separation and transparency under Article 7(2) of the General Data 
Protection Regulation is to be transferred to the inclusion of terms and conditions. 
Only those rights and obligations which have been set out in a one-page document 
(see Recommendation no. 1) are binding.  
4. Re determining the contracting partner 
When consumers effect legal transactions via a platform, it is often difficult for them to 
recognise whether they have entered into a contractual relationship with the platform or not 
and what services the platform provides (free information, free or chargeable referral, or a 
free or chargeable advisory service). The added problem in the sharing economy is that 
consumers do not know whether the service providers are themselves a consumer or an 
entrepreneur. The solution to this problem is to reverse the burden of proof. In reality, 
platforms already in effect exercise control over the available information or could at least do 
so.161 
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The Advisory Council recommends: (1) In accordance with the proposal put forward 
by France, the platform operator must provide precise information about the service’s 
function and the nature of the legal relationships; if the platform requires consumers 
to open a user account, this information is to be provided before the account is 
created. (2) In line with its actual function, the platform operator must take on a 
monitoring and control function; in the event of violating these obligations it will be 
liable vis-à-vis the consumer. (3) A rule should be introduced in the sharing economy 
based on which anyone providing chargeable services via a platform is to be treated 
like an entrepreneur within the meaning of section 14 of the German Civil Code until 
the opposite is proven. 
5. Re the subject of the legal relationship 
In the case of “as is” digital services, the legislature needs to clarify whether a contractual 
relationship or a quasi-contractual relationship with mutual rights and obligations has been 
established. Section 312 (1) of the German Civil Code, which requires non-gratuitous 
performance in the case of a contract, is not only not compatible with EU law, it also does not 
reflect reality on the Internet. Consumers de facto pay for the digital service with their data. 
The Advisory Council recommends making it clear that “as is” digital services 
constitute a legal relationship which is linked to rights and obligations. 
In the case of “as is” digital services, the provider is responsible for determining and altering 
the services to be provided. Since a legal relationship has been established, providers of “as 
is” services are subject to the exact same requirements as the providers of chargeable 
services. They must provide information in two information documents on the planned 
processing of data and the subject matter of the contract defined via terms and conditions, as 
well as about any changes made during the contract term.  
The Advisory Council recommends extending the rule on information documents 
which must be transmitted before a legal relationship is established to include “as is” 
services. 
One of the key challenges in the digital world is the “structural erosion of ownership”.162 
Where a consumer purchases an electronic device, the property is without function until the 
device can be used together with software. The fundamental subject matter of the contract is 
thus the possibility of using the software installed on the electronic device. Its scope is 
defined under copyright law and given concrete form in the terms and conditions. Users have 
long been formulating their demands under the heading of “fair use”.  
The Advisory Council recommends adding those clauses which are typically found in 
digital contexts and, in particular, in end-user agreements to the black and grey list of 
prohibited clauses. 
Those questions which have arisen following the introduction of smart contracts have as yet 
not been solved. According to Gerald Spindler, a smart contract is a program for self-
executing intelligent contracts.163 A smart contract can be implemented directly using 
blockchain technology. It enables the conclusion of a contract to be monitored electronically. 
Factual reasons why, for example, an instalment has not been paid cannot be processed in 
the system.  
The Advisory Council recommends stepping up research into the possible use of 
blockchain technology and the possible legal consequences of smart contracts.  
Three different legal fields come together when the subject matter of the legal relationships is 
put in concrete form, although their legal effects are compatible only to a very limited degree: 
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data protection law, copyright law, and civil and consumer law. The shifting of a great deal of 
legislative competence onto the EU has increased the preponderance of overlapping rules. 
The combination of data protection and copyright law determines the rules applicable in the 
digital economy and is superimposed on classic civil-law rules laid down in the German Civil 
Code. This development goes beyond consumer law and also affects B2C contracts. The 
process is in particular used in the financial sector as such (crypto currencies such as Bitcoin 
and Ethereum). However, first pilot projects using blockchains are also being run in the 
United States in other areas, such as the energy sector to sideline energy providers and to 
be able to effect energy trade more cheaply and directly via producers, for instance 
prosumers.164 The problem becomes particularly virulent on account of the use of terms and 
conditions which shape the services contract, influence the end-user agreement and indicate 
that there are points of contact with data protection law.165 
The Advisory Council recommends systematically analysing the interplay between 
data protection law, copyright law and private/consumer law, because only a holistic 
perspective opens up the possibility of finding generalised rules which could provide 
insights and indicate the way forward for the digital world. From the consumer 
perspective, what is of the greatest importance in the short term is how the monitoring 
of terms and conditions can be brought into line with data protection and copyright 
law. 
When merging previously distinct legal fields we have to reconsider whether and how 
counterperformance “in data” has an impact on the subject matter of the contract. The 
Advisory Council will be issuing a separate opinion on this issue in summer 2017. 
Ch. Wendehorst166 argues that non-compliance with the data protection safeguards under 
Article 25 of the General Data Protection Regulation on data protection by technology is to 
be regarded as a material defect within the meaning of section 434 of the German Civil 
Code. However, on account of its being geared to the functionality of the item purchased, the 
current definition of “material defect”, Wendehorst claims, is not suited to defining privacy by 
design and privacy by default as criteria for contractual conformity. According to Gerald 
Spindler,167 the basic IT security of products represents an essential protective and ancillary 
contractual obligation.  
The Advisory Council recommends making it clear that privacy by design and privacy 
by default as well as basic IT security measures are part of the definition of the “use 
intended under the contract” within the meaning of section 434 (1) no. 1 of the German 
Civil Code. 
6. Re the rights resulting from the legal relationship 
The right of data portability was introduced in Article 20 of the General Data Protection 
Regulation following the ECJ’s Google ruling. The right aims to give consumers the option of 
moving their online profile from one social network, for instance, to another with only one 
click of the mouse. Many questions this right raises have not yet been answered and need 
investigating in more depth: How similar do the networks need to be? How can data 
portability be effected technically? How are third-party rights to be safeguarded? How can we 
prevent potential costs being taken into account as a ground for exclusion? The question of 
how the right of data portability is dovetailed with contract law has not yet been answered. 
Once again, data protection law and contract law need to be synchronised. The wording of 
Article 20 of the General Data Protection Regulation does not make it clear whether 
consumers can only assert the right if they wish to transfer data to another provider or 
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whether they can also request that the data be returned if they do not plan to change 
providers. It is precisely the right of such transferral to the consumer which needs to be 
guaranteed.  
The Advisory Council recommends making it clear that the right of data portability is 
also to be understood as a right of termination by means of which consumers can 
demand that their data be returned free of charge and deleted on a standard, machine-
readable and interoperable medium.  
The Internet of Things raises specific legal questions on account, firstly, of the digital content 
of the contract (interoperability, security, functionality, maintenance, updates, patches, 
privacy by design and by default) and, secondly, because of the discrepancy between the 
purchase contract and the embedded digital content, outsourced digital content, updates of 
digital content, digital services and data access, which are generally provided by third 
parties.168 Both issues are a matter for intense debate. Account must here be taken of the 
fact that, from the consumer’s perspective, the purchase contract and digital content 
provided by third parties are a self-contained entity, even though they are legally separate. 
Neither a unified model, nor an agency model, nor a guarantee model provides satisfactory 
solutions, because these options tend to hold the dealer/seller liable for third-party services. 
The solution might be to introduce product warranty liability, which is primarily directed 
against the producer of a technical device who is liable vis-à-vis the consumer for providing 
third-party digital services or rather vis-à-vis the importer domiciled in the EU who imports the 
products into the EU.  
The Advisory Council recommends, to counteract the discrepancy between the 
purchase contract and digital content provided by third parties, that product warranty 
liability be introduced against the producer or against the importer into the EU who is 
also liable against the consumer as regards third-party digital services. 
7. Re improving individual redress 
When enacted to implement the ADR Directive and the ODR Regulation, the Consumer 
Dispute Resolution Act created a uniform framework for out-of-court dispute resolution, both 
in the national and EU context. In view of the fact that it only entered into force on 1 April 
2016, it is still too early for an evaluation.169 Under section 43 (2) of the Consumer Dispute 
Resolution Act, the functioning of the arbitration board is to be evaluated by 31 December 
2020. The Advisory Council believes it is key that the necessary precautions are taken now 
in order to be able to evaluate that information which comes together in the arbitration 
boards. This evaluation should distinguish between the type of legal conflict, the involved 
enterprises, the affected sectors and the products. Legal practice without law, as it were, is to 
be avoided, especially when the stored data are located elsewhere in Europe. Even though 
out-of-court dispute resolution aims at reaching compromises, these too must be based on 
the law. To ensure this is the case, the information (and in particular the evaluation) 
produced in the arbitration boards needs to be published. Section 34 of the Consumer 
Dispute Resolution Act makes only very vague requirements which lead us to expect there 
will be a high degree of heterogeneity.170  
Model contracts could contribute to finding digital contracts by means of arbitration. Business 
and consumer associations could together make a key contribution to increasing legal 
certainty. 
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The Advisory Council suggests that business and consumer associations should be 
involved in drafting model contracts for digital services which not only safeguard key 
elements of the content of such contracts but also link in to arbitration mechanisms.  
The focus should be on new forms of private action. Passenger rights are one such example. 
These are asserted with the help of commercially active intermediaries who realise consumer 
rights against payment of a percentage share.171 They undeniably help many consumers to 
assert their rights. However, providers of such services only handle clear-cut cases. 
Consumers are left alone to deal with high-risk cases or are referred to publicly-funded 
consumer associations. Recently, some airlines have also taken to ruling out the option of 
assigning rights to intermediaries in their terms and conditions (e.g. Ryanair). 
The Advisory Board suggests closely monitoring the effects of private, commercial 
mechanisms on redress backed by associations. 
8. Re improving collective redress  
At the interface between market practices and terms and conditions, the German system of 
legal redress is based solely on a privately organised system of collective redress by 
consumer associations and by industry associations. When it comes to monitoring terms and 
conditions, trade associations are de facto not an option. Although they do in fact have legal 
standing, in the 40 years since the introduction of the right of representative action 
(Verbandsklage), use has been made of this option under very rare circumstances. For 
instance, a private action lies with the Federation of German Consumer Associations, which 
is funded by the Federal Government, and with those consumer associations which the 
Länder (federal sates) have given sufficient means to realise the right of representative 
action. In the field of fair trading law the trade associations handle around two thirds of 
cases, some of which at least concern consumer interests. The other third of cases are dealt 
with by the aforementioned consumer associations. Where there are points of contact with 
consumer data protection, consumer associations have been entitled, since 2016, to file a 
cease-and-desist order against enterprises. However, it is the often under-funded data 
protection authorities which are primarily responsible, even though the representative actions 
consumer associations have brought have made a key contribution to clarifying what the 
requirements for consent are under data protection law. 
Despite the considerable legislative effort involved, cross-border representative action is 
hardly an option in practice. The questions of jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement of 
a German judgment abroad or, vice versa, of a foreign decision in Germany are too difficult 
to answer. Existing EU legislation is not tailored to collective representative action and raises 
numerous legal questions for the clarification of which – in addition to the procedure under 
Regulation 2006/2004 on cross-border cooperation in consumer protection172 – the consumer 
associations are fairly unwilling to spend their scare resources. That is why consumer 
organisations in the EU Member States, with the help of the European umbrella association 
BEUC, identify cross-border practices against which the national associations can take 
coordinated action. Official cross-border networks cannot fill this gap, including on account of 
a lack of the necessary powers of intervention beyond a cease-and-desist order. 
It appears, given the current state of the political debate, that one solution could be to 
expand the Federal Cartel Office. If this expansion were linear, it would also lead to an 
expansion of the legal remedies available to the Federal Cartel Office to include the 
monitoring of advertising and of terms and conditions. As opposed to the warning procedure 
and cease-and-desist claim, the Federal Cartel Office could, under section 32 (2a) of the Act 
against Restraints of Competition, order reimbursement of the benefits generated. This 
provision could be extended to include disadvantages which consumers suffer on account of 
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impermissible business terms or unfair advertising. This would be entirely in the spirit of 
Article 8 of the proposal put forward by the European Commission for the reform of 
Regulation 2006/2004, which was supposed to serve as the benchmark for those minimum 
legal remedies which are to be available. These mechanisms for official redress in consumer 
protection are on no account supposed to replace the work of the consumer organisations, 
but they can be a sensible complement to it. However, it would have to be guaranteed that 
the digital agency exercises its powers to assert consumer rights independently and not out 
of any economic or political considerations.  
The Advisory Council agrees with the thrust of this year’s Consumer Law Conference 
at which calls were made to add governmental monitoring (digital agency) to legal 
redress through associations. Based on the example set by the UK, an additional 
“super complaint” would be a conceivable option, a procedure in which associations 
could force the authorities to act by calling on a court if need be. 
9. Re the suitable means for implementing the proposals 
The proposed solutions touch on a number of statutory provisions. This is due to the different 
logic applied to the provisions of consumer protection law in the German Civil Code and 
efforts to synchronise data protection law and the law of general terms and conditions. 
The Advisory Council advocates implementing the proposals in a manner which 
maintains the cohesion between the proposed rules. In view of the political 
sensitivities which go along with any interference with the German Civil Code, 
amendments to the German Civil Code should be limited to what is absolutely 
essential. More specifically, a presumption rule for commercial activities would have 
to be incorporated into sections 13 and 14 of the German Civil Code and consent 
under data protection law brought into line with consent under the law of general 
terms and conditions. 
10. Re the need for an evidence-based consumer policy 
The Advisory Council commissioned an exploratory study into which data are available in 
consumer protection law and which are not.173 Point VIII of the report enumerates a long list 
of gaps and makes concrete proposals for how these gaps are to be filled. There are hardly 
any politically robust data on consumer protection law, beyond needs- and project-based 
results. Data capture using parameters which are standardised across Europe driven forward 
by means of market watchdog projects promises to bring about improvements in the field of 
legal advisory services and legal representation provided by consumer associations in the 
Länder. Such efforts have, however, not yet been undertaken in other areas. 
The Advisory Council recommends taking the necessary precautions in order to be 
able to shape an evidence-based consumer law policy. 
11. Re the problem of competence 
The proposed solutions will impact on the European Union’s system of competencies. A 
distinction has to be drawn between directives which merely lay down a minimum level of 
harmonisation, such as Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC on the sale of 
consumer goods, and those directives aiming at full harmonisation. In particular, these 
include the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC, Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial 
practices and Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights. The definitions of “consumer” and 
“entrepreneur” are not fully harmonised.  
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France’s attempts to adopt rules on information provision via platforms to the benefit of 
French consumers met with resistance from the European Commission, including on account 
of the fact that they touch on the area of application of the E-Commerce Directive and the 
Directive on unfair commercial practices. In the light of this perspective, it is to be expected 
that the European Commission will also resist the following proposals: 
• Packaging of offers (including services), 
• Data protection information document, 
• Determining the contracting partner, 
• Control and monitoring function of platforms, 
• Fair use of copyright-protected software programs and, possibly, 
• Product warranty liability. 
An answer should be found, by way of a legal opinion, to the following question: How 
precisely should the solution options be defined to avoid conflict with EU law as far as 
possible and to strengthen national autonomy of action? 
The Advisory Council is convinced that Germany is free to take the political lead and, 
possibly together with other Member States, to call on the European Commission to 
act. 
 
Part IV Algorithms, software agents, code and big data 
The macro perspective aims to provide an outlook on the pressing issues and possible 
solutions associated with ongoing developments in regard to digital technologies in the fields 
of software agent systems, regulation by algorithm and the potential of big data. Discussions 
about how these terms are to be defined and delimited from one another vary greatly 
according to which discipline is involved. The Advisory Council uses the terms as follows: 
“Code”174 is the generic term used to describe programming languages in general. An 
“algorithm” is part of a code and is implemented in various programming languages; it 
describes certain programming logics. A “software agent” is a program (based on code and 
more specifically on algorithms) which can act relatively autonomously – depending on the 
type of agent it can respond to the environment and interact “socially” with other agents. 
In line with its remit, the Advisory Council regards its task as identifying groups of questions 
and coming up with possible solutions so as to initiate a debate on political solutions. At the 
superordinate level of digitalisation, three big transformation processes can be made out 
which are based on the emergence of self-learning algorithms,175 of big data and 
transformation technologies. These big transformation processes offer consumers as yet 
unknown potential for autonomous and social action via the Internet, but they also generate 
new risks of as yet unknown dimensions. The transformation processes can potentially 
• link access to goods and services to discriminatory conditions,  
• facilitate unfair commercial practices not on the basis of false information but based 
on a better understanding of consumer behaviour,  
• modify the Internet code at will unless algorithms are described in legal relationships, 
which is still generally not the case. 
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Since L. Lessig’s groundbreaking 1999 article a debate has again and again arisen about the 
ability to regulate and the need to regulate those rules which business itself created and 
which dominate both access to and the functioning and content of the Internet. Today the 
focus is less on the “code” than on the question of whether and to what extent algorithms can 
and should be subject to regulation. Should refers to the political need or desirability.  
The German legislature took unilateral action by laying down rules on scoring in section 28b 
of the Federal Data Protection Act. One can fitly argue the pros and cons of the political 
necessity for doing so, in particular how much sense this German rule makes. However, 
should it be possible to justify the need for this intervention, then it appears to make little 
sense in hoping that it will be possible to find an EU or international solution which can be 
coordinated with the United States, China, Russia and India. Concrete political action will 
also be required to launch a debate at the international level.  
The question of political necessity needs to be kept separate from that of technical feasibility, 
that is whether one can. Where humans are responsible for an algorithm, the solution 
appears to be simple, that is if one ignores the fact that programmers and lawyers each 
speak their own languages. Self-learning algorithms present new obstacles, because they 
raise no more and no less than the matter of to what extent legal rules can be translated into 
the Internet’s binary code. It seems that the legislature will find it comparatively easy to come 
up with a rule on data profiling. The General Data Protection Regulation already addresses 
the issue. But here, too, the problems seem to go much deeper than merely disclosing the 
relevant profiling technologies.  
I. Algorithms and artificial intelligence 
What is decisive from the legal perspective is whether it is possible to determine 
responsibilities, because that is precisely what is up for discussion where self-learning 
algorithms are concerned. It is useful to distinguish between the design laid down by the 
software program and the action to be potentially carried out.  
1. Responsibilities 
The software program defines the design, but not the action to be potentially carried out. The 
following example may make the distinction between the two types of algorithm clear: Take 
two salespeople, one who works in a department store, the other in a bazaar. The owner of 
the department store instructs the salesperson to sell product X for Y euros, product X1 for 
Y1 euros, etc. If the product is faulty, the salesperson is instructed to grant a 20% rebate. 
The aim is clear: The owner wants to cover all conceivable options by giving precise 
instructions. The salesperson may not in fact stick to these rules, but that would then mean 
going against instructions. The owner of the bazaar chooses an entirely different approach, 
saying that he paid X1 and Y1 for product X and product Y, that the salesperson is to make 
as much profit as he wants, to negotiate the prices himself. If the potential buyer is wealthy, 
the salesperson is to start at a high price. Buyers of X nationality tend to like Y products, 
women prefer Y products. The salesperson is free to give or promise customers add-ons. 
The owner is only interested in the salesperson making as much profit as possible. The 
second owner only gives the salesperson a goal, but leaves the salesperson to decide how 
to achieve it. 
The first case can be evaluated ex ante, the second needs an ex-post review, because it is 
only possible to find out exactly how the salesperson made use of the leeway granted after 
the sale has been made. If both tasks are assigned to computer software, then the crucial 
question is this: Legally speaking, these types of actions are not neutral. They may breach 
applicable law if carried out by humans. The law cannot directly impose rules on software 
agents, since software agents cannot “understand” and cannot “read” the law. The law would 
have to have been programmed into the software agents. On the other hand, software 
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agents are “fully designable”:176 They are what the programmer makes them. How that can 
be done, how and whether programming languages and legal language are in fact 
compatible or can be made compatible is a question which the computer and legal sciences 
will have to investigate together. 
In practice, enterprises use algorithms to profile consumers, to design online information and 
advisory programs ranging from financial services (known as robo-advisers) to health apps, 
and to offer “as is” digital services.177 The spectrum is broad: from simple algorithms which 
ask for four or five items of information and then deliver information on that basis, up to 
highly complex algorithms which send Internet users the information they requested and link 
it to advertising and sales offers. Consumers themselves could become users of software 
agents as soon as the Internet of Things takes on more concrete shape, for example in the 
case of refrigerators ordering food from a supermarket. 
2. Legal classification  
Principal Agent Theory can be used to fruitful effect when it comes to assigning legal 
responsibilities. If it is possible to identify the principal, then the law has no problem when it 
comes to legal classification. In the course of adopting the E-Commerce Directive the 
question came up of how to legally classify the automatic forwarding of an email. At that time 
the question above all revolved around access when the consumer (buyer) receives an 
automatic reply. These legal issues are a thing of the past, because their classification did 
not in fact prove to be seriously difficult.178 A legal assessment of self-learning algorithms will 
prove more difficult, since it ultimately raises the question of how artificial intelligence (AI) 
impacts the legal system, whether the agent is no longer to be assigned to the principal, 
whether the software agent itself becomes an autonomously acting legal subject or the 
principal who has configured the self-learning algorithm still has ultimate responsibility. In 
other words: Who is the principal and who is the agent? 
This is, of course, not the place to present the debate around AI, let alone to take a stand on 
that debate. Mention need here only be made of the fact that the academic debate has two 
shortcomings: First, AI experts do not understand the law, and lawyers do not understand AI. 
Second, the debate is dominated by stereotypical thinking, with the exceptionalists on one 
side and the unexceptionalists on the other, and only a few exceptions.179 The only question 
at issue here is how to assess self-learning algorithms: Do self-learning algorithms only 
adapt their results based on the type and nature of the data processed or do they also 
change the source code itself?  
The answer does not appear to be so simple. Self-learning should not be equated with 
changing or even rewriting the source code. How “autonomous” the algorithm is in turn 
depends on the source code itself. The problem can be discussed using an example:180 
“The algorithm’s task (stated by a user) is to display a commercial to 1000 people 
who have the highest chance of buying a product, say: insomnia pills. This is the 
human input. The programmer does not know what people will be ‛available’ (how 
many, or what data will be available) when writing the algorithm. What the 
algorithm gets from the user is that insomnia pills are for people who cannot 
sleep. Self-learning process is the following: algorithm itself collects data about 
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people and discovers patterns – people in age X on average sleep in hours Y-Z; 
stress causes insomnia; events x, y, z cause stress -> based on this, if someone 
is in age X and is not asleep in hours Y-Z and undergoes an event x or y or z, the 
program decides to display the commercial to such a person. Later, it evaluates 
its own choice by seeing how many of these people actually clicked the link. It 
might see that most of the people who clicked where living in the cities, or in 
northern countries, etc. It would add this to its database for the future etc. It 
generally learns a lot about people from observing what they do, how they 
respond to incentives etc. In this sense, when the algorithm gets the task ‛display 
the commercial to 1000 people having the highest chance of buying it’ a few 
months later, it can ‛decide’ to show it to a completely different set of people, 
possibly in a more effective way. Even though no human re-programmed it. It did 
re-program itself in a manner foreseen by the programmer, but not in the 
direction foreseen (direction was ‘chosen’ by the software itself). That is why 
‘autonomous’ is not autonomous in a human sense. It is limited. But it is not 
merely automatic. Whether this is the change of the source code, or just 
modification of a database, depends on particular programming technique and 
our terminology – but at least for legal purposes, this does not matter that much. 
What matters is that the process was not merely ‘automatic’.” 
The difference is relevant because a software agent can make a choice which is legally not 
correct. In the above example the scenario could be regarded as a prohibited type of 
aggressive advertising. In a slightly modified form the choice could be regarded as 
discrimination based on gender or ethnicity (where higher prices are offered to those who are 
prepared to pay more; the potential addressees of advertising are uncoupled on the basis of 
their political opinion or sexual orientation). Both anti-discrimination law181 and fair trading 
law182 establish boundaries for such practices. The fact that systematic breaches of the law 
are possible is one key reason why rules on algorithms should be enshrined in law. Such 
illegal practices are generally hidden from view, although they are certainly no mirage, as 
first empirical studies have already shown.183 If a self-learning algorithm “decides” not to pass 
information on to a particular country, the potential users are uncoupled from access. The 
software agent operates on the basis of a predefined goal, but the software agent itself 
chooses which concrete actions to take to achieve that goal. The way in which the software 
agent decides to take which action is pre-programmed, but no-one can predict precisely what 
the software agent will do.  
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As well as this internal perspective, that is the relationship between the principal and the 
agent, account also needs to be taken of the network effect. The complexity of self-learning 
algorithms is based on the interaction between systems, between the algorithms themselves 
in an interconnected environment. This represents an emergence in which responsibility is 
distributed across many actors. In an interconnected city, for example, numerous sensors 
and systems interact with driverless cars. It is conceivable that in future systems will be able 
to continue developing their own algorithms, in which case algorithms will write algorithms.  
Now it is not the case that these algorithms are operating in a legal vacuum so to speak, only 
that software agents are not explicitly regulated by law. Under the law as it currently stands, 
software agents are regarded as tools applied by humans, by an enterprise or a body 
responsible for the algorithm. Whenever a software agent produces discriminatory, unfair or 
misleading market practices, the person or body responsible for producing the algorithm will 
be held responsible. As things currently stand, the law of general terms and conditions, anti-
discrimination law and, above all, fair trading law play a key role. The only sanction provided 
for under German law is a stop-order mechanism, that is the incriminating practice is 
prohibited ex nunc. 
At least that is what it looks like on paper. However, since the actions which software agents 
take are largely hidden from view, there is little chance of legal breaches being found out. As 
a result, enterprises’ willingness to abide by the law necessarily drops too. Applying the 
terminology of economic legal analysis, this means that where the costs of incorporating 
legal requirements into the algorithm are higher than the potential loss after illegal actions 
are found out, enterprises will see little need to comply with legal rules ex ante. This leads to 
the call for algorithms, even self-learning ones, to have to comply with applicable law. The 
principle of transparency should apply to algorithms and it ought to be possible to check 
whether the law is being complied with. 
II. Big data, information asymmetry and profiling 
Commonly applied definitions of neither “big data” nor “profiling” are yet available, and so 
various definitions are in use. A simple and pragmatic approach will suffice for our purposes. 
“Big data” is here defined as any technology which permits unlimited quantities of data to be 
gathered and processed, whereby the data are accessible because users have put them into 
the Internet and sufficient technical capacities are available for evaluating them.184 “Profiling” 
is here defined as any technology which permits conclusions to be drawn from existing data 
and profiles regarding individual behaviour.185 Article 4(4) of the General Data Protection 
Regulation contains a legal definition:  
“‘Profiling’ means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting 
of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a 
natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural 
person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, 
interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements.” 
1. The problem 
Information asymmetry is not a new problem. The whole of existing consumer law is based 
on the idea that asymmetries can be eliminated using government-prescribed information 
rules. Despite all the criticism, above all from the behavioural sciences, consumer policy is 
sticking to this paradigm, not least because society rightly assumes that legal subjects act 
autonomously and under their own responsibility. The need to differentiate between different 
consumer models does not change that premise. No-one is calling the normative model of 
democratic societies into question.  
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The linking of insights gained in the behavioural sciences with big data and profiling 
technologies has given rise to a new kind of information asymmetry. In the analogue world 
the business sector knows more about products and markets. Consumer behaviour research 
used to be time-consuming and expensive, and its findings were only of limited use. Big data 
and profiling give the business world the chance to analyse consumer behaviour in a 
targeted manner, to better understand why a particular decision was taken and thus to get to 
know consumers better than they know themselves (or even want to know themselves).186 
This advantage means targeted advertising campaigns can be used in entirely new ways to 
drastically reduce costs and increase the efficiency of the advertising means employed.  
Example 
Imagine a person with the following Google profile: male/female, aged 26–30, 
works from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m., buys medicines online. If that person permits 
localisation on their smartphone, then Google knows when they are at home and 
how long they sleep at night and are motionless. Google can also see when that 
person gets up at 3 a.m. and picks up their mobile phone. A supplier of sleeping 
pills could charge Google with offering its products around that time of night to 
those consumers who have difficulty sleeping and who browse the Internet to 
distract themselves. Such a transaction would not be the result of information 
asymmetry about the product or market, but about the manner in which, the 
conditions under which and the time of day when consumers take a decision. The 
entrepreneur knows what consumers do not know, namely that they behave as 
predicted by Google under the given conditions. 
2. Legal classification 
Existing protective mechanisms available in applicable consumer contract law cover these 
situations as little as the relatively recent Unfair Commercial Practices Directive does, which 
the German legislature has incorporated into the Act against Unfair Competition. As far as 
the situation upstream of the conclusion of a contract is concerned, under applicable law it is 
already doubtful whether consumers actually have a right to information. The prevailing 
opinion is that the prohibition of misleading advertising or of a misleading omission is not 
equal to the consumer’s right to objective information about the qualities of a product or 
service. In our example the problem does not revolve around information about the product 
or service. In any case, stricter requirements are applied in the law of medicines to limit the 
scope of advertising much more than in other fields. The suppliers of sleeping pills are only 
interested in the consumer’s behaviour. It is specifically that knowledge about the 
consumer’s behaviour which opens up new sales methods to them.  
The extremely wide definition of advertising applied in the Directive and thus also in German 
law permits marketing oriented to consumer behaviour to be subsumed under the 
requirements of fair trading law. Only, under applicable law consumers ought to have no right 
to the offer to buy sleeping pills at 3 a.m. in the morning being based on a sophisticated 
analysis of their behaviour profile.187 The question also remains of whether, even if they were 
aware of that when making their purchase, consumers would behave differently or whether 
they would be happy to take up the offer. Consumers may take a different decision if they are 
able to find out beforehand what kind of profile Google has of them, knowing that they can 
influence their data by deleting or changing data, for instance.  
Articles 13 and 15 of the General Data Protection Regulation give consumers rights to 
information and rights of access which specifically also cover profiling. In the light of the 
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Federal Data Protection Act, it seems reasonable to interpret the General Data Protection 
Regulation such that consumers are at least to be informed about the basic assumptions 
applied in the algorithm logic on which the profiling is based.188 EU law trusts in the power 
and assertiveness of each individual. Individuals first need to be aware of the problem, they 
need to assert their claim and possibly apply to a court. What we need is not just one 
Schrems, but many Schrems. It is more than doubtful whether it would be possible to get a 
grip on information asymmetry even if bundling were possible. In addition, the General Data 
Protection Regulation does not provide for data protection authorities to intervene instead of 
the Regulation. Since data processing is not linked to binding general requirements, the data 
protection authorities entrusted with their implementation also appear to lack the competence 
to measure the algorithms applied against a standard benchmark and, where applicable, to 
demand that corrections be made.  
III. Potential solutions as regards regulating algorithms and big data 
The use of algorithms and the prospects opened up by self-learning algorithms which update 
the source code raises questions of an altogether different dimension than when one takes 
the micro perspective of digital services. The issue here is not only one of maintaining the 
autonomy of consumers, which was to be the driver behind potential solutions as regards the 
law of digital services, but of human dignity in the age of artificial intelligence (AI). The 
political challenge is to answer the question of how to ensure that self-learning algorithms 
“act” in an ethically responsible manner. Can politics trust in business, in competition, in 
independent ethical behaviour on the part of those who are responsible for driving forward 
developments when it comes to AI? And, even more difficult, what will happen when AI takes 
on a life of its own? How can a self-controlling process be politically, ethically and legally 
mainstreamed? 
The Advisory Council believes that it is the political realm which is called to act. The question 
is no longer whether political action is necessary, but what type of action that could be. A 
normative component needs to be incorporated into the algorithms. Under the lofty rubric of 
“human dignity” and the autonomy of human beings, the issue when it comes to consumer 
law would be compliance with the prohibition of discrimination, fair advertising, consumer 
data protection law and fair terms and conditions. Once this basic issue has been solved – 
and the Advisory Council is convinced that political action is what is needed – we will find a 
series of obstacles strewn across the path towards implementation of that goal which have 
their origin in the different rationality behind law and technology.189  
1. Requirements under the Federal Data Protection Act 
The 20th century legislative model requires that the government create a legal framework for 
technology within the context of which business itself develops its own technical standards. 
The manufacturers of technical products are obliged by the legislature to comply with the 
state of technology and the state of scientific knowledge. Standardisation bodies have a key 
role to play in this, since it is they which flesh out the framework provided by the legislature. 
In Germany, consumers are involved in the process of standardisation through the DIN 
Consumer Advisory Board. Once adopted, standards enjoy privileged status. Once the 
manufacturer has certified that its products meet these standards, either itself or via 
independent third-party institutions (e.g. TÜV), products can be put on the market without 
further governmental control. In the event of a claim, it is assumed until the opposite is 
proven that the manufacturer has met any legal obligations. The EU took over this model 
cum grano salis in the mid-1980s and applied it to technical regulation in Europe. 
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The German legislature took a different path in section 28b of the Federal Data Protection 
Act. In that provision it obliged loan agencies in particular to comply with scientifically-
mathematically recognised standards and did not allow them to process especially sensitive 
data within the meaning of section 3 no. 9 of the Federal Data Protection Act. The provisions 
read as follows. 
Federal Data Protection Act  
Section 28b 
Scoring 
For the purpose of deciding on the creation, execution or termination of a 
contractual relationship with the data subject, a probability value for certain future 
action by the data subject may be calculated or used if 
1. the data used to calculate the probability value are demonstrably essential for 
calculating the probability of the action on the basis of a scientifically 
recognised mathematical-statistical procedure [emphasis added],  
2. in case the probability value is calculated by a credit inquiry agency, the 
conditions for transferring the data used under section 29 and in all other cases 
the conditions of admissible use of data under section 28 are met,  
3. (...) 
4. (...) 
Section 3 
Further definitions 
(...)  
(9) “Special categories of personal data” means information on a person’s racial 
or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical convictions, union 
membership, health or sex life.  
(...) 
A case is pending before the Federal Constitutional Court against the Schufa credit agency 
concerning the matter of whether Schufa should have to disclose its scoring algorithms. The 
Federal Court of Justice negated just that.190 The Federal Constitutional Court has not yet 
declared whether it will accept the constitutional complaint for decision. Germany’s highest 
court has therefore not yet clarified which requirements are to be made of a scientifically 
recognised mathematical-statistical procedure. As regards sensitive data, section 28 (8) read 
in conjunction with subsection (6) of the Federal Data Protection Act at any rate sets limits 
when it comes to those criteria which may be applied when determining the score value. 
What has not yet been clarified is the extent to which the boundaries set in section 19 and 
section 20 of the General Equal Treatment Act (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, 
AGG) have an impact on data capture. The US Equal Access Opportunity Act is clearer in 
that respect.191 Monitoring compliance with statutory requirements is the responsibility of the 
data protection authorities. In view of the relatively low mathematical/technical complexity of 
scoring and the possibility of assigning responsibilities, competent monitoring ought to be 
safeguarded.192 
The Advisory Council notes that the existing rule in section 28b of the Federal Data 
Protection Act represents a useful starting point when it comes to regulating self-
learning algorithms. 
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2. Requirements under the General Data Protection Regulation 
Nevertheless, the provision in section 28b of the Federal Data Protection Act cannot be 
transferred to self-learning algorithms which autonomously update and change programs and 
network among themselves. The US Federal Trade Commission has taken up this problem 
and is investigating the need to increase and options for increasing transparency.193 
Concrete results are not yet available.  
The General Data Protection Regulation only addresses algorithms in the form of an 
individual entitlement to information and access. This regulatory technique is well-known, as 
it was used in Directive 2008/48/EC, where the obligation to issue credit responsibly is 
conceived merely as information.194 
General Data Protection Regulation 
Article 13 
Information to be provided where personal data are 
collected from the data subject 
(...)  
(2) In addition to the information referred to in paragraph 1, the controller shall, at 
the time when personal data are obtained, provide the data subject [emphasis 
added] with the following further information necessary to ensure fair and 
transparent processing:   
(...) 
(f) the existence of automated decision-making [emphasis added], including 
profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, 
meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and 
the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.  
(...) 
Article 15 
Right of access by the data subject 
(1) The data subject [emphasis added] shall have the right to obtain from the 
controller confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him or her 
are being processed, and, where that is the case, access to the personal data 
and the following information:  
(...) 
(h) the existence of automated decision-making [emphasis added], including 
profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, 
meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and 
the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject. (…) 
Article 9 
Processing of special categories of personal data 
(1) Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing 
of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural 
person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or 
sexual orientation shall be prohibited.   
(…) 
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However, unlike section 28b of the German Federal Data Protection Act, the General Data 
Protection Regulation does not make any legally binding requirements in respect of scoring, 
apart from in Recital 71, according to which “the controller should use appropriate 
mathematical or statistical procedures for the profiling”. Unlike section 28b of the Federal 
Data Protection Act, requirements made of business under the Regulation are subject to a 
threefold restriction: 
• the requirements made under Recital 71 should be complied with, not “are to be” or 
“must be” complied with, 
• the procedures must be appropriate and not necessarily “scientific”, 
• the procedure should be mathematical or statistical and not mathematical-
statistical.  
Normally, matters on which no political agreement can be reached are moved into the 
recitals. Ultimately, it is then up to the European Court of Justice to decide to what extent 
enterprises must use mathematical-statistical procedures, what that means, what standards 
are to be applied to the mathematical or statistical procedures or what happens if enterprises 
do not comply with the requirements set in Recital 71. What concrete impact this lowering of 
standards will have on the distribution of competencies and what scope the German 
legislature actually retains in view of full harmonisation will need to be discussed 
elsewhere.195 At least Article 9(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation, like the Federal 
Data Protection Act, prohibits the processing of sensitive data. The restrictions imposed on 
this prohibition will not be addressed here. 
Opening up Recital 71 of the General Data Protection Regulation by, in a way, generally 
binding business in the same way as in section 28b of the Federal Data Protection Act 
cannot hide the fact that the primary addressees of the EU requirements are citizens who 
want to assert their right to information and access. However, under the provision of Recital 
63, that right “should not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others, including trade 
secrets or intellectual property and in particular the copyright protecting the software”. In the 
light of the Federal Data Protection Act, it is obvious that the General Data Protection 
Regulation should be interpreted to mean that consumers should at least be informed about 
the basic assumptions made in the algorithm logic.196 Depending on the outcome of the 
proceedings pending before the Federal Constitutional Court, the question of the relationship 
between EU law and Germany’s Basic Law could also be raised. Even if it were possible to 
push through the German legal position across Europe – perhaps after it is underpinned by 
constitutional law – we are still left, in regard to this complex issue, with requirements under 
EU law which do not go very far because they are entirely guided by the power of individuals 
and their ability to assert their rights.  
There are considerable consequences as regards official legal redress. Profiling also has to 
be measured against the provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation on the 
admissibility of personal data processing. However, under Article 58(1a) of the Regulation, 
the data protection authorities are also tasked with monitoring and implementing application 
of the Regulation. This concerns the principles applied to data processing as set out in 
Chapter II (Articles 5 to 11) of the Regulation. It is not entirely clear whether the monitoring 
obligation also applies to the algorithms used, which are only referred to in regard to the 
rights of the data subject in Chapter III, and then only in the recitals, which have no legal 
force. Even if there were such an obligation, there are no uniform standards to which the 
authorities could gear their activities. 
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The Advisory Council notes that the rudimentary approaches to regulating algorithms 
set out in the General Data Protection Regulation are insufficient and fall below even 
the standard applied in section 28b of the Federal Data Protection Act. 
3. Re the three possible options for a regulatory approach 
The Advisory Council notes that there are theoretically three possible options for 
regulating this matter: 
• proactive (legality by design): the legislature could oblige enterprises to 
incorporate binding legal requirements into algorithm development;  
• reactive: the legislature could restrict itself to obliging enterprises to comply 
with the law when developing algorithms (which actually goes without saying) 
and then focus on ex-post monitoring; 
• the happy medium: the legislature could set a regulatory framework which 
combines binding governmental requirements with self-regulation.  
These options will be outlined and analysed in the following. 
4. Re lack of transferability of technical regulation  
If the legislature decides to take the proactive approach, in the light of a century’s worth of 
experience, it would make sense to oblige industry to comply with the rules of technology. 
The following triad has become established both legislatively and constitutionally197 when it 
comes to regulating product safety:198 the generally recognised rules of technology; the state 
of the art; and the current state of science and technology. It is obvious even at first glance 
that the German legislature has set the bar high in section 28b of the Federal Data Protection 
Act. Credit institutions must apply scientifically validated methods, that is not only those 
which are generally recognised and generally applied but those which stand up to being 
measured against scientifically validated standards. One of these three standards has taken 
root, namely the generally recognised rules of technology in the field of consumer goods and 
the current state of science and technology for medicinal products. Where products are 
subject to pre-market control exercised by government authorities, these are obliged to 
examine compatibility with binding government requirements when licensing products. 
Where no such pre-market controls are conducted, which – for good reason – is the case for 
all technical consumer goods, either the manufacturers themselves or authorised certification 
agencies establish whether the product meets the generally recognised rules of technology. 
The point of reference when conducting this assessment is generally the technical standards 
drawn up by German standardisation bodies or by EU standardisation institutions. Within the 
EU, self-certification or third-party certification guarantees manufacturers (or importers) 
access to the Single Market. However, manufacturers are not obliged to abide by technical 
standards. They can also apply other methods to ensure they are complying with the 
statutory safety requirements. Corrective measures are taken under labiality law. Where 
products give rise to damage despite standards being complied with, the courts can hold 
manufacturers liable in so far as this proves justified.  
Transferring the above approach to digitalisation, the legislature could set binding standards 
as regards developing algorithms. One conceivable option would be, for example, to 
reformulate Article 9 of the General Data Protection Regulation (the prohibition of processing 
sensitive data and its exceptions) in this way. As simple and convincing as such a rule may 
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appear, it would at best solve questions concerning automated programming by software 
agents, but not programming by autonomous software agents. Compliance with legal 
requirements can, therefore, only be guaranteed if they are not only incorporated into the 
source code but if they are also automatically taken into account whenever an autonomous 
change is made. To be able to do that, legal rules would have to be made compatible with 
the logic of the “code”, which only understands “yes” and “no” and cannot cope with vaguely 
formulated general legal clauses (e.g. “good faith” or “good morals”).  
Across the world research teams are working on the options which legality by design opens 
up. Opinions differ as to their feasibility. Thinking this through to the end, full compatibility 
would mean reducing the law down to a “yes” or a “no” and incorporating legal reality into this 
“yes/no” logic. Legality by design would have to be shaped in such a way that all possible 
cases could be broken down into “yes/no”. It would also be worth thinking about 
incorporating an option into an algorithm in which a competent human being would have to 
be called in where uncertainty arises as to how to handle reality. It is clear that a great deal 
more research needs to be done here. It is currently still unclear whether such compatibility 
can actually be created by technical means. 
In fact, the trend when it comes to standard-setting in consumer law is towards general 
clauses. It is not least the adoption of the idea of social protection (the protection of the 
weakest under law) which has meant that the number of legal rules which bind the 
contracting parties to the principles of good faith, good morals and, less spectacularly, 
compliance with sensible and adequate rules has increased exponentially. The politically 
desired greater level of protection in private-law relationships contrasts with a loss of legal 
certainty. At any rate, the functional logic of algorithms could have positive consequences if 
the legislature were forced to differentiate more strictly than before between prohibitions 
which are absolute and those which are linked to sensible benchmarks. The development of 
black lists in fair trading law and the law of general terms and conditions, as well as the 
prohibitions of discrimination, which are absolute, bear witness to the possible developments 
which modern consumer legislation might undergo.199 Even if it were possible to shift the 
focus of consumer law, we would still be left with many rules where the standards 
themselves leave considerable scope for interpretation on account of being formulated in the 
style of general clauses. As well as considerable doubts as to how complex legal realities 
can be processed, the criticism raised against the feasibility of implementing the law in 
algorithms is above all directed against the fact that it is hardly conceivable how general 
clauses are to be translated into a mathematical programming language.  
The Advisory Council notes that it will not be possible to regulate algorithms using the 
means and technologies available for regulating industrial products. 
5. Re the deficits and consequences of a reactive approach 
In reality, control is currently being exercised purely reactively. Enterprises in the digital 
economy use the freedom afforded by liberal market economies to define algorithms 
independently. To what extent existing algorithms comply with the requirements of applicable 
consumer law and of anti-discrimination law, to name just two legal fields, is currently largely 
not subject to any ex post factum control of whatever shape or form. The reason is simple: 
Potential illegal results can only be identified by the respective addressee, and that only 
theoretically.  
If one nevertheless wanted to advocate purely ex-post controls, then there would be two 
prerequisites: (1) a digital agency which has the requisite technical and legal resources to be 
able to check whether the technology is compatible with the law and (2) an obligation to 
disclose the algorithm with all its autonomous modifications to a closed circle of government 
controllers.  
                                                      
199
 The report commissioned by the Advisory Council and submitted by Rott (op. cit., fn. 157) adopts 
the same approach. 
64 
 
The need for a digital agency entirely independently of the existence of a law of algorithms is 
addressed elsewhere.200 Letting things go on as before and trusting in the self-responsibility 
of business and the self-regulatory power of competition without an obligation to register and 
without the obligation to disclose algorithms is at any rate not a serious option. In view of the 
current pace of social change, not only in the world of business, and its potential impact on 
human beings, a purely reactive political approach is not an option. 
The Advisory Council is convinced that sticking to “business as usual” is, politically 
speaking, not a serious option. The political realm is called to drop the option of ex-
post controls, the de facto approach, and to look for a regulation which does justice to 
the specific features of algorithms. 
6. Re the limited possibilities of co-regulation 
Attempts to link governmental and private regulation can be found along the spectrum 
between the two extremes of pre-market and post-market controls. All these considerations 
are, tacitly, based on the idea that it will be possible to get a handle on algorithms in the 
same was as it was possible to get a grip on the health and safety risks posed by consumer 
goods on the one hand and the machines and technology used in the production of goods on 
the other.  
Gerald Spindler and Christian Thorun put forward a carefully elaborated proposal for co-
regulation in a report they submitted to the registered society Selbstregulierung 
Informationswirtschaft.201 The basic idea is that the (German) legislature should adopt 
framework legislation which sets out the minimum requirements as regards standard-setting 
(clear targets, participatory approach, decision-making, transparency, financing, 
standardisation organisation gets no copyright) as well as regarding enforcing those 
standards (binding commitment, monitoring, complaints mechanism, sanctions).202 
Spindler/Thorun do not themselves address co-regulation so as to pick up on the risks of 
automated and self-learning algorithms by software agents. They test their proposal in four 
areas: data protection; unfair competition; IT security; liability law and telemedia law with civil 
law and ancillary areas (in particular consumer protection law). Without calling the potential 
of co-regulation in regard to the four areas into question from the outset, scepticism as to 
how the model proposed by Spindler/Thorun could be transferred to the regulation of 
algorithms nevertheless predominates.  
Even the EU’s attempts to take advantage of the tried and tested system of governmental 
framework-setting and private standard-setting for services by and large miss the mark. One 
could raise the objection that there is as yet no European legislation available for 
standardising services;203 in addition, when it comes to the digital world, it is hard to see why 
the digital economy should agree to set voluntary standards which could go beyond general 
guidelines or even codes of practice. The digital economy is dynamic; new business models 
are constantly evolving which generally involve algorithms. However, standard-setting is a 
rather more static process. Private standard-setting tends to codify the past, at any rate in so 
far as standards describe products. If one takes the example of health apps,204 the question 
arises of why companies providing these services should cooperate with each other, given 
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that their main business purpose is to set themselves apart from potential competitors. The 
world of industrial products, by comparison, is reliant on standard-setting, because products 
would otherwise not be compatible with each other. This applies all the more since 
translating the law into the language of codes goes hand in hand with a very considerable 
level of investment in which there is above all a public interest.  
The Advisory Council notes that the widely touted co-regulation in the form of 
government procedural framework-setting to regulate algorithms needs to be 
modified. 
7. Re the need for an Algorithm Act 
The Advisory Council feels there is an urgent need for political action in order to maintain 
consumers’ autonomy and dignity in a digital world. The use of algorithms and the 
foreseeable developments as regards self-learning algorithms in a world which is becoming 
increasingly interconnected all affect deep-seated ethical principles of our communal life. It is 
up to politics in Germany to face up to this challenge. Leaving things to business as in the 
past is not a serious option, especially since the most innovative sectors of the economy are 
not based in Germany. That action needs to be taken now. In an ideal world, the forum in 
which an adequate solution would be sought would be the European Union or, perhaps 
better still, the OECD and the United Nations. The need to act cannot be postponed 
indefinitely.  
The Advisory Council recommends  
(1) putting in place the legal requirements to ensure that algorithms take account 
of the requirements of consumer law, data protection law, anti-discrimination 
law and digital security. In the case of algorithms which enter into direct 
contact with consumers, the underlying parameters need to be made 
transparent. Legal responsibility also needs to be assignable in the case of 
self-learning algorithms and applicable consumer protection regulations need 
to be complied with; 
(2) ensuring that, based on standardised disclosure requirements, algorithms are 
disclosed to a circle of experts in the digital agency who carry out spot checks 
to see whether they are legally sound. Standardised software engineering 
procedures need to be developed to that end; 
(3) that enterprises should also be called on to draw up a code of conduct on the 
use of personal data, AI systems and big data analysis. 
8. Re the problem of competence 
One conflict with the EU which is likely foreseeable is inherent to the General Data Protection 
Regulation, whose objective is full harmonisation. The above-cited rights to information and 
access under Articles 9, 13 and 15 of the Regulation do not justify a line of argument which 
the European Commission may put forward, namely that the Regulation leaves no room for 
enacting national legislation on algorithms. Article 40 of the Regulation and the concomitant 
Recital 72 go much further: 
General Data Protection Regulation 
Article 40 
Codes of conduct 
(1) The Member States, the supervisory authorities, the Board and the 
Commission shall encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct intended to 
contribute to the proper application of this Regulation, taking account of the 
specific features of the various processing sectors and the specific needs of 
micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.  
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(2) Associations and other bodies representing categories of controllers or 
processors may prepare codes of conduct, or amend or extend such codes, for 
the purpose of specifying the application of this Regulation, such as with regard 
to:   
(a) fair and transparent processing; 
(…)  
(5) Associations and other bodies referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article which 
intend to prepare a code of conduct or to amend or extend an existing code shall 
submit the draft code, amendment or extension to the supervisory authority which 
is competent pursuant to Article 55. The supervisory authority shall provide an 
opinion on whether the draft code, amendment or extension complies with this 
Regulation and shall approve that draft code, amendment or extension if it finds 
that it provides sufficient appropriate safeguards.   
(…) 
(9) The Commission may, by way of implementing acts, decide that the approved 
code of conduct, amendment or extension submitted to it pursuant to paragraph 8 
of this Article have general validity within the Union. Those implementing acts 
shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure set out in Article 
93(2).   
(…) 
Recital 72: Profiling is subject to the rules of this Regulation governing the 
processing of personal data, such as the legal grounds for processing or data 
protection principles [emphasis added]. The European Data Protection Board 
established by this Regulation (the ‘Board’) should be able to issue guidance in 
that context. 
In view of the general wording of Article 40 of the Regulation and of Recital 72, combined 
with the fact that the Regulation also covers mathematical and statistical profiling 
procedures, it does not seem so far-fetched that the Member States might have handed over 
competence for regulating legal matters relating to algorithms to the EU. That is, at any rate, 
true as regards the field of data protection. An Algorithm Act would, however, go way beyond 
formulating mere data protection principles. At its core, it has to address the economic and 
social order in a digital world, for which the EU does not have a mandate. The EU cannot 
interfere so far into the future of the Member States’ economic and social order via the 
“backdoor” of data protection regulations and claim such wide-ranging competencies for 
itself.  
Subject to more in-depth investigation, the Advisory Council believes that competence 
for drawing up an Algorithm Act has remained with the Member States, despite the 
objective of full harmonisation set out in the General Data Protection Regulation.  
 
Part V Digital agency – institutional embedding, remit and competencies 
The law of digital services has shortcomings which cannot be overcome using the existing 
institutional structure. The first problem is the legislature’s lack of trust in consumers 
themselves, the second its lack of trust in the associations which are to rely on contract law, 
the law of general terms and conditions, and fair trading law to meet the challenges the 
digital world poses. The 2016 Consumer Law Conference205 strongly substantiated the need 
to add a second pillar to the current system which relies on associations. The digital 
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economy was not the topic of the Conference, which instead dealt with possible 
shortcomings as regards the enforcement of rights and conclusions to be drawn from them. 
Given the current situation, it appears that consumer rights enforcement may be delegated to 
the Federal Cartel Office.206 
Shortcomings as regards the enforcement of rights are exacerbated in the digital world, 
providing further justification for expanding the Federal Cartel Office. In the light of the role of 
software agents, regulation by code, big data and profiling, the focus will in the future above 
all be on what scientific skills shortages there are on the part of the government and which 
skills are needed to meet the challenges posed by AI.  
I. Skills shortages and shortcomings as regards legal redress 
Skills shortages and shortcomings as regards legal redress should be kept strictly separate. 
The government lacks experts with specific skills because there is no body in which the 
diverse activities of German ministries are pooled and systemised. Shortcomings as regards 
legal redress indicate the difficulties inherent to the digital world when it comes to asserting 
applicable law. From the consumer’s perspective this above all concerns fair trading law, the 
law of general terms and conditions, and anti-discrimination law. 
The scientific skills shortages which exist in this new world inhabited by software agents, 
self-learning algorithms, big data and profiling are obvious.207 Essentially, it is necessary to 
build technical capacities by and with governmental agencies in order to put policy-makers in 
the position where they can be proactively involved in shaping further developments in the 
digital world. This will only succeed if they cooperate with the academic and business worlds. 
Drafting a law of algorithms is perhaps one of the biggest challenges of the next few years. 
However, there is still great uncertainty regarding developments in the world of AI and, above 
all, regarding the question of whether and possibly how programming languages and legal 
language can be dovetailed. The Advisory Council believes that policy-makers urgently need 
to act to overcome these shortcomings. There are foreign models which can be drawn upon. 
The Grand Coalition Government is recognisably willing to expand the Federal Cartel Office, 
and not only to restructure it into a consumer authority but also to incorporate legal issues 
raised in the digital world. This task will only succeed if the Federal Cartel Office addresses 
both the enforcement of rights and those questions which research has not yet been able to 
answer and also provides scientifically sound policy advice. The resources needed to do that 
must be made available. 
Problems around rights enforcement make up the second big set of issues which are further 
exacerbated in the digital economy. The key points in question here are: circumventing 
existing rules, difficulties linked to rights enforcement in the digital world, individualisation of 
rights enforcement, the time lag between court decisions and problems which require an 
immediate remedy, and the often cross-border dimension of consumer problems which 
necessitates cooperation with institutions in other Member States.  
Some business models in the digital world work are particularly successful online because 
they (can) circumvent analogue law. Robo-advisers evade the oversight of the Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority; health apps do not provide the visual structures needed to 
check whether they comply with consumer protection law; and telemedicine projects often 
operate in a legal grey area. Wide-ranging competence for addressing such matters would 
help to close the regulatory gap. Rights enforcement in the digital world has become difficult: 
firstly, due to the deterritorialisation of law in the (globalised) Internet and, secondly, due to 
the possibility of using algorithms to seemingly individualise advertising, offers, prices and, 
ultimately, contracts – although that individualisation may be based on discrimination. This 
discrimination is not necessarily focused on any specific individual, but on a group of 
individuals with certain features defined by algorithms. These phenomena can only be 
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brought to light (if at all) by a governmental body which can oblige enterprises to disclose 
data and supply information. 
In view of the scale of the problems which the digital world raises, it will not be sufficient to 
place one’s trust in consumers as before, that is consumers who individually assert their 
rights and sometimes spend many years fighting for their rights in court. The political weight 
of individual claims, even if they do lead to such spectacular successes as in the case of 
Schrems,208 is of only limited relevance in specific instances and will not help consumers as 
a whole. Time lag is another issue. No courts have ever solved any burning issues.209 Only 
very few of the platform business models have so far come into contact with governmental 
enforcement bodies (courts or authorities). One need only consider personalised advertising 
and/or personalised information.  
Private consumer protection associations are not in a position to act as the sole bodies 
entitled to enforce rights in the same way as governmental authorities are, to whom 
enterprises are required to disclose information as part of these authorities’ remits. Another 
difficulty is that, in the transnational context, governmental authorities are typically tasked 
with rights enforcement, they share information and cooperate.210 The whole of EU law is 
tailored to consumer rights being enforced by authorities. Not only the sectoral authorities 
forcefully promoted by the EU in regulated markets but also the orientation to the cross-
border enforcement of rights has led to the successive shifting of balance within existing 
competencies. 
Conversely, involving platforms in alternative dispute resolution opens up legal redress 
options which only an authority can implement. As, in the medium term, all disputes will be 
handled via platforms, it is relatively easy to filter out who has filed a complaint, where they 
are from, what they are complaining about, the subject matter of and the reason for the 
dispute, whether it concerns incorrect information, incorrect education or incorrect advice, 
and who the opposing party is. This creates a data pool in which it would be possible to find 
out precisely and within seconds which bank, for example, receives the most complaints in 
which country generated by which consumers. Not only the competent institutions’ dispute 
resolution mechanisms but their complaints mechanisms and complaints management can 
be digitalised. The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority can already generate electronic 
consumer complaints which can then be analysed in that way.211 The Brazilian Ministry of 
Justice generates an electronic database based on complaints. Each year it publishes a 
ranking list of enterprises which react most swiftly or in the most consumer friendly 
manner.212 In Germany and in Europe such models require compliance with data protection 
regulations, as well as with strict limits within which the responsibilities of “leading” 
enterprises can be listed. Data protection conflicts with efficient consumer protection. 
Although this is nothing new, in the age of digitalisation the problem takes on hitherto 
inconceivable dimensions. 
A governmental authority which has the required digital skills and is actively involved in 
protecting collective consumer interests would be a decisive, key step which is well overdue 
in Germany. Two things need to be guaranteed: The availability of scientific expertise to 
answer the questions raised in the digital world, and the availability of sufficient powers which 
enable the governmental agency to prohibit certain practices and help consumers claim 
compensation. The EU’s proposal for amending Regulation 2006/2004/EC offers key 
suggestions as regards the list of competencies required.  
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II. Foreign models 
As far as can be seen, quite a few examples are available in the western world of what a 
digital agency could look like. Developments seem to have progressed furthest in the United 
States and in the United Kingdom.213 What both countries have in common is that the matter 
was incorporated into existing supervisory bodies. As far as is known, no country has a 
digital agency which is an autonomous and separate authority. 
In the United States, the matter falls within the remit of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
which comprises three parts: the Bureau of Competition, the Bureau of Consumer Protection 
and the Bureau of Economics. The FTC is an independent authority with far-reaching 
investigatory and regulatory powers. Originally entrusted with overseeing competition, the 
FTC was also tasked with consumer protection issues as consumer policy has gained 
increasing importance over the past 60 years. The Bureau of Consumer Protection has eight 
divisions: the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection (which oversees the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act, among other legislation), the Division of Advertising Practices, 
the Division of Consumer and Business Education, the Division of Enforcement, the Division 
on Marketing Practices (which combats high-tech/Internet fraud, for example), the Division of 
Consumer Response and Operation, the Division of Financial Services and the Division of 
Litigation Technology and Analysis. The latter is relevant for our concerns, as it has a key 
role when it comes to investigating and dealing with consumer issues when the focus is on 
new technologies.214 The department comprises seven units: the Digital Forensic Unit, the E-
Discovery Unit, Forensic Accountants, Honors Paralegals, Mobile/Internet Lab, Office of 
Technology Research and Investigation, and Technology Planning. 
The Office of Technology Research and Investigation (OTech) was created in 2015 as the 
successor to the FTC’s Mobile Technology Unit (MTU), which dealt with consumer issues 
against the backdrop of the explosive growth in mobile phone use. The MTU launched a 
number of studies, including ones on mobile shopping,215 health apps216 and “mobile 
cramming”, that is the practice of charging services to mobile phone bills which have not 
been ordered.217 OTech has been placed on a broader footing and is to be used to raise the 
FTC’s consumer profile. That is to be achieved by providing expertise on data security, smart 
cars, smart homes, transparency of algorithms, new payment methods, big data and the 
Internet of Things.218 OTech provides the FTC with technical expertise, it identifies and 
structures relevant research projects, and develops new consumer research methods.219 
Thus, OTech acts in an advisory capacity within the FTC. It supports the FTC in regard to its 
remit of investigating relevant issues and preparing measures for regulating the digital 
economy. So far, OTech has restricted itself to the scientific treatment of relevant fields of 
digitalisation. 
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In the UK the issue falls within the remit of the Competitions and Markets Authority (CMA), 
which was established in 2014 following the merger of two previously separate institutions, 
the Office of Fair Trading (which was responsible for monitoring unfair advertising and terms 
and conditions) and the Competition Commission. The CMA employs 700 people and has 
offices in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It has six divisions: the Corporate Services 
Directorate, the Market and Mergers Directorate, the Enforcement Directorate, Legal Service, 
Policy and International, and Economic Adviser. Just like the FTC, the CMA also has wide-
ranging investigatory and regulatory powers. The focus is less on regulation than on what is 
known as its policy of the “light touch”, which means that interference with the business world 
is to be restricted to the absolute minimum where possible.220 In this spirit, the CMA has 
drawn up a series of guidelines, commentaries and opinions on the digital economy. The 
current focus is on what is known as open banking, based on the revised EU Payment 
Services Directive. The aim of open banking is to enable customers to share their data with 
new service providers so as to make it easier and simpler for customers to administer their 
accounts.221 The CMA is planning projects on online interviews, data use and price 
comparison websites in 2016 and 2017, all guided by the attempt to bring the advantages for 
consumers into line with those for enterprises.222 
In 2013 the Netherlands combined three previously independent authorities into one: the 
Competition Authority (NMA), the Post und Telecommunication Authority (OPTA) and the 
Consumer Authority (CA). The newly established Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM) 
is an independent authority with wide-ranging investigatory and control powers. It employs 
more than 500 people and comprises seven departments which essentially still strongly 
reflect the originally independent authorities: the Consumer Department, Energy Department, 
Telecommunication, Transport and Postal Services Department, Competition Department, 
Legal Department, Corporate Services Department and the Health Care Taskforce. Factual 
and legal issues are allocated on the basis of institutional linkages to the former OPTA. The 
equivalent in Germany would be if it were decided to combine the Federal Network Agency 
with the Federal Cartel Office. The Transport und Postal Services Department deals with all 
the issues around the Internet, mobile phones, TV, radio and postal services, especially 
including what is defined in this report as the law of digital services.223 
What conclusions can be drawn from these foreign models when it comes to establishing a 
digital agency in Germany? Basically, a model developed in one country cannot readily be 
transferred to another. Each country has its very own history and has developed its very own 
understanding of what role and function governmental authorities have when it comes to 
regulating the economy. After the Second World War, Germany created a cartel office in the 
course of restructuring its economy and – unlike in the three countries mentioned in the 
above – its remit was not expanded to include consumer protection. The necessary 
consequence of the decision to have associations in charge of controlling advertising 
practices and terms and conditions was that it is only they which are responsible for legal 
redress. Since they are private civil-society organisations, consumer associations cannot be 
assigned investigatory powers.  
By expanding the Federal Cartel Office into a consumer authority, Germany would be taking 
a long-overdue step, at any rate if one takes the other EU Member States or the United 
States as the benchmark. That would, in particular, apply to the institutional linking of cartel 
law and consumer law. However, as far as the digital economy is concerned, it is even more 
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important than in the analogue economy to note that shortcomings are divided into skills 
shortages and shortcomings as regards legal redress, as diagnosed in the above. Compared 
to the United States, the UK and the Netherlands, Germany and German authorities have not 
evolved any comparable practice of drawing up scientifically founded opinions, 
commentaries and recommendations on individual consumer law issues. This appears to be 
changing in the course of the spread of digital technology in particular, as the cooperation 
between the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy and the Federal Ministry of 
Justice and Consumer Protection on platforms shows. The market watchdog for the digital 
world and the watchdog for the financial market, which are funded by the Federal Ministry of 
Justice and Consumer Protection, also suggest this is the case. The watchdogs monitor the 
market, record and empirically evaluate consumer complaints, analyse them and point out 
systemic errors in the market by means of targeted scientifically based studies, for example. 
They inform the competent supervisory authorities – such as the Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority and the Federal Network Agency – as well as the general public of 
their results at an early stage.224 However, the market watchdogs will not be able to remedy 
those shortcomings which have been described in detail here on their own. 
Should the Federal Cartel Office be restructured, then it must above all be ensured that the 
required expertise about the digital world is available, not only in order to be able to assert 
consumer rights in the digital economy, but also so as to be able to draw up expert reports 
on new issues and problems to support policy-makers in their decision-making. Much speaks 
in favour of creating a third pillar within the Federal Cartel Office or at any rate of creating a 
separate department. This would also have the advantage of it being possible to deal with 
questions concerning the digital economy in an interdisciplinary manner. At any rate, 
however, based on the US example a separate department should be created which can 
operate independently of the other two pillars (cartel law and consumer law). The UK and the 
Netherlands fall behind the United States in this regard. Beyond formal institutional 
independence, the comparison opens up the possibility of a further, noteworthy phenomenon 
which has less to do with the digitalisation of the economy and more to do with i-government. 
It is particularly noteworthy that in the Netherlands and the UK the CMA and the ACM 
respectively present themselves on the Internet less by means of organisational charts and 
competences as through people and their professional skills, especially when it comes to 
digitalisation.  
III. Potential solutions as regards the need for a digital agency 
The law of digital services contains a problem as regards legal redress. In the world of 
software agents, of regulation by code and big data, the primary problem is that competence 
is not concentrated in governmental agencies. The problems as regards legal redress when 
it comes to digital services can be countered by improving individual redress and 
restructuring the Federal Cartel Office into a consumer protection authority so as to 
strengthen collective redress. The Advisory Council has made proposals in this regard (see 
II. 7. re individual redress and II. 8. re collective redress). In order to be able to tackle the 
really big challenges posed by the digital world, AI, autonomous algorithms, regulation 
through the code, big data and profiling, a further, decisive political step needs to be taken, 
namely the establishment of a digital agency which is sufficiently equipped so that it can be 
expanded into a digital competence centre where discourses are channelled, bundled and 
actioned. 
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The Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection and the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and Energy have adopted a clear position:225 
Digital agency: Pooling consumer protection, competition and market rules. 
Economic and consumer policy need to keep pace both with digitalisation and 
with the dynamics of change. One important step is strong monitoring 
competence. The current fragmentation of competencies within supervisory 
authorities and above all the lack of competencies is of no help to any of the 
market players. When it comes to competition, market and consumer issues 
which concern digitalisation, we not only need a digital agenda but also a “digital 
agency”. At least, though, the remits of existing authorities need to more precisely 
defined. 
The focus must be on expanding technical competence. Without competence there can be 
no regulation and no monitoring. Germany does not yet have such a competence centre. 
According to media reports, technical and regulatory competence is spread across several 
different ministries. The following questions thus arise as regards the establishment of a 
digital agency:  
• Should the digital agency be institutionally independent or part of an existing 
institution? Should the tasks arising in the digital world be assigned to the Federal 
Cartel Office or should an independent authority be created into which data protection 
would be integrated? Is bundling competencies in a single ministry an option (based 
on the example of the European Commission, which has a separate ministry 
dedicated to the digital world and largely independent of business and consumers)? 
• What competencies should the digital agency have? Investigative and advisory or 
regulatory too? If the latter is the case, should it also be given the competence to 
issue bans, impose sanctions, to itself set standards (like in the US) and to claim 
collective damages (like in the UK)? 
• What should cooperation with consumer organisations look like when it comes to 
legal redress? Should the digital agency pass the results of its own investigations on 
to consumer associations upon their request if the agency does not itself plan to take 
any further steps? Should there be any cooperation with the market watchdog for the 
digital world and if so what form should it take?  
• How can it be guaranteed that the digital agency exercises its powers independently, 
possibly based on the example of the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and 
Freedom of Information? 
1.  Re the need for immediate political action 
The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States have already acted. They have 
incorporated digital competence centres into their available governmental competition and 
consumer protection monitoring agencies. A series of reports on dealing with current or long-
term problems published after consulting with business and consumer representatives bear 
witness to the growing political commitment of these bodies. Depending on how they are 
structured, these authorities propose governmental measures, recommend relevant 
measures to the government and parliament, or adopt measures themselves. Germany is 
lagging behind in this regard. The disadvantages for the economy and for consumers are 
obvious and have been variously documented.  
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It is obvious that political action is necessary. The decision to establish a digital agency, in 
whatever form, cannot be postponed. No ministry, no authority likes to relinquish 
competence. But that is exactly what needs to happen so as to first be able to join all forces 
and then find out what skills shortages exist. Some fundamental re-thinking is needed and a 
new administrative legal culture needs to be developed in which it is understood that the 
current fragmentation of competencies across the ministries and the lack of legal instruments 
for effective regulation is a matter which urgently needs remedying. 
The Advisory Council recommends establishing a digital agency in which previous 
competencies linked to digital services are pooled and expanded. 
2. Re institutional embedding of the digital agency 
From the point of view of consumer protection, there are three options as far as the 
institutional embedding or integration of a digital agency is concerned: the Federal Cartel 
Office, the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, or a 
separate, new authority.  
In the course of liberalising its markets, the EU has massively promoted the establishment of 
authorities – to control and monitor telecommunications, energy and finances and to control 
consumer law only when it comes to cross-border redress. Germany created the Federal 
Network Agency and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, two authorities which, 
under pressure from EU law, incorporated the protection of collective consumer interests into 
their remit. Germany only acted to the extent that the EU imposed requirements. That is why 
the Federal Office for Motor Vehicles is under no obligation to protect consumer interests. 
Not even the scandal engulfing VW was sufficient to politically confirm a change to its remit. 
Should the German Government’s plan, namely to assign the Federal Cartel Office 
competence for consumer protection, come to fruition, this would provide the option, for the 
first time, of firmly establishing official control of consumer protection law horizontally and not 
sectorally.  
Taking such a perspective it at any rate from the point of view of consumer protection 
appears plausible that the entire complex of issues surrounding the digital economy should 
be assigned to the Federal Cartel Office. That would make it possible to tap into considerable 
synergies between the individual fields which would be lost if a separate authority were to be 
established for each task. In that case it would have to be ensured that as well as monitoring 
unfair advertising and terms and conditions the Federal Cartel Office would also be able to 
pursue infringements of the General Equal Treatment Act. Examples taken from the digital 
world show that this is a key problem area. 
The other options appear more problematical by comparison. Establishing a separate 
authority may be easier to achieve, because that way all the ministries have to relinquish 
competencies in equal measure and these are then bundled in the new agency. However, 
this option could prove dysfunctional, because there would be no links to anti-trust law, to 
consumer law and to anti-discrimination law. The other option, blending data protection and 
digital tasks, appears even more difficult to implement politically, because the Länder are 
also involved in monitoring data protection. One option worth considering would be 
upgrading the Federal Network Agency, though in view of its broad-based competence for 
electricity, gas, telecommunications, post and railways this appears problematical.  
The Advisory Council is in favour of assigning the Federal Cartel Office those tasks 
which are being considered as part of the digital agency’s remit. This will ensure that 
those legal issues which the digital economy raises and which go together are not 
pulled apart on extraneous grounds. 
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3. Re the tasks and competencies of the digital agency 
Assigning these tasks to the Federal Cartel Office would ensure that the available monitoring 
and control mechanisms could also be available to the digital economy. In the first instance 
that would mean redress mechanisms, to which the list of proposals for the reformed 
Regulation 2006/2004 would need to be added (see II. 8.).  
There are skills shortages as regards those tasks which are upstream of legal redress. The 
digital agency must be given the possibility of investigating relevant sub-issues itself, of 
financing third-party research, drawing up proposals, discussing these with the involved 
sectors of the economy and consumers, drawing up codes of conduct and introducing 
concrete measures into the legislative process. 
The Advisory Council recommends assigning all the necessary tasks to the digital 
agency and guaranteeing it the necessary resources so that it is in a position to 
proactively investigate technical and legal issues raised in the digital economy, to 
draw up proposals, discuss these in the public domain, develop codes of conduct with 
business and consumers, and to develop recommendations and proposals for the 
legislature. 
4. Re the problem of competence 
The Member States are in principle free to organise and shape legal redress as they see fit. 
That goes both for the question of whether enforcement of consumer law is to be placed in 
the hands of associations and the extent and reach of the competencies. But the scope for 
action is not unlimited. Legal redress must be based on the principle of effectiveness and 
equivalence developed by the ECJ. The diverse EU directives and regulations set 
institutional and procedural requirements which the Member States must comply with in their 
implementation. 
More specifically, amalgamating the government agencies involved in regulating sectoral 
markets raises a problem which has now reached the ECJ: EU law obliges the Member 
States to establish independent agencies to control regulated markets (telecommunications, 
energy, finance and cross-border consumer protection). What exactly “independent” is 
supposed to mean and to what extent the independence required under the EU regulations 
and directives could be endangered as a consequence of authorities being amalgamated or 
tasks being merged will be based entirely on how that agency is institutionally embedded. 
The Advisory Council recommends commissioning a legal expert opinion which 
addresses the question of the merging of German authorities to the extent that these 
are also required to implement tasks for which EU law sets legally binding institutional 
and procedural requirements. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
